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ABSTRACT
This study aims at analyzing the issue of under-representation of women in the
Estonian parliament (Riigikogu) with the help of Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris
and Christian Welzel’s approach of modernization. The analysis of the situation in
Estonia, as a unique case makes it possible to test the theory in use. The empirical
analysis consists mainly of data derived from semi-structured interviews with experts
in the field of gender equality in Estonia. As Estonia has yet to emphasize the
importance of gender equality, today, women are still highly under-represented in
the Riigikogu. The main results show that while the scholars claim that cultural
barriers constitute the main hurdle for women to enter the political sphere, in the
case of Estonia, the socioeconomic situation and institutional barriers clearly keep
women from the possibility to participate in politics. Further, instead of religion
as main cultural influence, in Estonia the cultural heritage is largely defined by the
society’s Soviet past. The overall conclusions state that while the theory at use
seemed to be applicable universally, in the case of Estonia it cannot be applied fully,
as crucial influences are not taken into account by the theory.
Acknowledgement
I wish to thank, first and foremost, my supervisor, Raili Marling, for all the time
and help she has given me throughout the process of writing and finalizing this
thesis. Her suggestions and critical feedback helped making the thesis a coherent
study. Further, I would like to thank all the interview partners for participating in
this study and taking time to meet me. This thesis would not have been possible
without the support of my dearest friends. Thank you for translating the Estonian
publications, proof reading and the moral support. And last but not least, I would
like to thank my family for giving me the possibility to complete this research and for
all the encouragement. Also, special thanks to my uncles for their critical opinions
and technical help.
Contents
Abstract
List of Abbreviations
INTRODUCTION
1 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 14
1.1 Modernization Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Inglehart’s Modernization Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Two Value Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Types of Societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Cultural Heritage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3 Gender Equality according to Inglehart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Attitudes towards Gender Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Gender Equality in Political Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4 The Unique Situations of the Post-Communist Countries . . . . . . . 30
Strong Emphasis on Secular-Rational Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Strong Emphasis on Survival Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Political Participation and Gender Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5 Criticism of Inglehart’s Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2 METHODOLOGY 38
2.1 Research Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Study Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 Primary and Secondary Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Qualitative Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3 Problems with the Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 THE CASE OF ESTONIA 45
3.1 Estonia – State and Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 The Estonian Value Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 Gender Equality in Estonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 Female Under-Representation in Estonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Structural Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Institutional Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Cultural Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 Application of Inglehart’s Modernization Theory on the Case of Estonia 71
4 CONCLUSIONS 74
Bibliography 77
List of Interview Partners 82
APPENDIXES 83
Figures and Tables by Inglehart, Norris and Welzel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Figures and Tables for the Case of Estonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Interview Question Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
List of Figures
1.1 Theory Figure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2 The WVS Cultural Map of the World until 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 The WVS Cultural Map of the World until 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 Value Shift Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 Religious Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6 Mass Attitudes towards Women’s Representation . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.7 Generational Differences on 1st Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.8 Shift towards 2nd Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.9 Political Engagement in CEE societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.10 Mass Attitudes towards Women’s Representation in CEE societies . . 35
3.1 Estonia’s Value Shift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 Gender Equality Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Egalitarian Attitudes towards Women in Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4 Should there be a higher percentage of women in these levels . . . . . 58
3.5 Strength of Religiosity Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.1 Role of Government Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
List of Tables
3.1 HDI scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 GDP per capita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Freedom House scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 Female Candidates and Elected Members of the European Parlia-
ment, the Riigikogu and Local Government Councils . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5 Distribution of Female Candidates on the Election Lists . . . . . . . . 63
A.1 Traditional/Secular-Rational Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
A.2 Survival/Self-Expression Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.3 Estonian Labour force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.4 Women in Elected Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
List of Abbreviations
CEE Central Eastern European
EU European Union
EVS European Value Survey
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HDI Human Development Index
WVS World Value Survey
INTRODUCTION
Female representation in legislative authorities is a topic that has deservedly gar-
nered increased attention over the last few years. Even today, in 2013, while the
European population is almost equally divided between the two sexes, only 23.2%
of parliamentarians are female (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2013). This number is
a clear indicator of the inequality in European governments as it is essential for the
legislative bodies to represent all groups of society in a balanced manner. While
the Nordic countries are seen as forerunners in the field of gender equality the re-
maining European member states are still struggling to catch up. One interesting
example is the case of Estonia, where, despite of its close proximity to the afore-
mentioned Nordic countries, gender equality, and particularly female representation
in the legislative body, is far from the norm in its geographical locale.
Estonia itself has been influenced by the West via Sweden and Germany and by
the East via Russia. Its past includes being a trade hub for the Hanseatic League as
well as serving as a puppet state for the Soviet Union. However, after 1991 Estonia
has strongly sought to associate itself with the West. All these past and present
influences can be seen in the melange that is Estonia. In terms of gender equality,
the Western influences advocating equal standing between the sexes seems to have
been overshadowed by the will to distance Estonia from its Soviet past, where gender
equality was enforced by an oppressive state. Therefore, any measures, internal or
EU-wide, to implement more gender equality may yield to criticism of being Soviet-
minded a common misunderstanding. The Estonian idea of equality seems to be
rooted in the neo-liberal approach emphasizing individualism.
Despite of the implementation of the required rules and regulations concerning
gender equality from the aquis communitaire upon joining the EU, to the adopt-
ing of gender equality action plans from other international organizations such as
the Beijing Platform, Estonia has yet to promote this issue as a key concern for
the country. Hence, in terms of legal requirements, Estonia has so for fulfilled the
requirements. However, those laws and regulations did not change the perception
and emphasis of gender equality in terms of attitudes of the society. Therefore, even
though it seems as if gender equality should be established, the reality is contradict-
ing. Therefore, the large gender pay gap and the low percentage of female members
in the Riigikogu (Estonian parliament) can be seen as indicators of gender inequality
in Estonia. While Estonia implemented the Gender Equality Act on the day of its
2004 accession to the EU and adopted a wider Equal Treatment Act in 2009, the
cultural aspects such as the stereotypes and deeply rooted negative perception of
gender equality have yet to change. In the case of Estonia, however, it is difficult to
clearly identify all of the obstacles that women face. Although Estonia is one of the
least religious countries in the world, it seems that traditional values, and by exten-
sion traditional gender roles, influence the society’s attitude towards gender equality
and female political representatives. This topic is in need of additional research to
shed more light on why women in Estonia continue to be under-represented in the
legislative body (Putzi, 2008; Marling, 2011).
One possible explanation for the under-representation of women in parliaments is
given by scholars Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris and Christian Welzel in their joint
paper ‘Gender Equality and Democracy’ (2002). Together they developed a univer-
sal theory that claims that the percentage of women in parliament increases on the
basis of a shift from survival values towards self-expression values. The theory out-
lines that societies based in self-expression values privilege freedom, tolerance, trust,
openness and equality while societies based on survival values emphasize economic
stability and security. The shift towards self-expression values is claimed to occur
through economic development. However, the cultural heritage of a society, mainly
defined by a society’s religion, plays a crucial role throughout the entire transition.
Furthermore, Inglehart and Norris emphasize in a different publication that struc-
tural, institutional and cultural barriers hinder the participation of women in the
political sphere (2003). With a long-standing good reputation in the field of research
concerning modernization and value change, Inglehart’s approach to modernization
is not burdened by extreme complexity, thus it can be used as an interesting yet
understandable reference-point. As Inglehart is one of the most cited scholars in his
field (specifically when it comes to his theory of modernization), the unique case
of Estonia offers a great opportunity to not only test his approach, but also to see
whether the theory can be applied on a micro level. When applying the key concepts
of Inglehart’s theory to the case of Estonia it seems that the evidence contradicts
his predictions rather than supports them.
Therefore, the main aim of this thesis is to analyze how Inglehart’s approach
to the under-representation of women in parliaments can be applied to the case
of Estonia and whether the theory can explain the situation in Estonia. More
precisely, if economic development and the influence of Estonia’s cultural heritage
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triggers a shift from survival to self-expression values, then the percentage of female
representatives in parliament should increase. To accurately assess the theory, the
impact of the two main influences shaping the discussion of gender equality and
women in parliament in Estonia, namely the Soviet past and the EU present, have to
be identified, especially when analyzing the existing barriers to female participation
in politics. With that in mind, in addition to assessing economic development, the
political and electoral systems have to be taken into account as well. In terms
of cultural heritage, Estonia’s religious background and its past are of particular
importance when analyzing attitudes towards women in the political sphere.
Despite gender equality not being a prominent topic in the political sphere in
Estonia, the subject has caught the attention of some scholars. Research about
gender equality as it relates to Estonia has increased over the last few years, how-
ever, most of the publications are written in Estonian. With this in mind, this
thesis also aims to contribute to the availability of research to the international
audience while combining existing publications with new findings. In the field of
women in the political sphere, only a few scholars have done research on the case
of Estonia. To contribute to this topic, the empirical aspect of this thesis consists
of semi-structured interviews with experts representing different institutions and or-
ganizations in Estonia. A total of 12 interviews were held with representatives and
former members of the Sotsiaalministeerium, independent advisers for the Estonian
government, scholars from the Tallinn University, and representatives from women’s
organizations and political women’s groups. The findings from those interviews,
along with the available literature, and reports from the Estonian government and
the European Union were analyzed in order to test Inglehart’s theoretical approach
to female under-representation.
The thesis will introduce the theory used in the analysis in the first chapter. In or-
der to put Inglehart’s approach of modernization in context, different approaches of
modernization are briefly introduced. The second section is concerned with the theo-
retical approach of Inglehart, Norris and Welzel. Overall, in numerous publications,
these three scholars defined a revised modernization theory, claiming that economic
development and the cultural heritage influence a society’s value set. Particularly,
the transition from agrarian to industrial societies, and further to post-industrial,
triggers a value change on two dimensions: the traditional/secular-rational value
dimension and the survival/self-expression value dimension. In terms of female rep-
resentation in legislative bodies, the scholars define a more precise theory predicting
that the triggered value change towards self-expression values on the second dimen-
sion will increase the percentage of women in parliaments. Therefore, the different
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components and concepts of the theory were defined and analyzed individually. The
third section introduces the concept of gender equality according to Inglehart and
his co-authors, and in particular the influence and impact of attitudes towards both
gender equality and female participation in the political arena. As this thesis is con-
cerned with the case of a post-Communist society, the fourth section gives insight
into the unique situation of the Central Eastern European societies in terms of In-
glehart’s approach. Finally, the first chapter is concluded by an overview of critique
of the theory from other scholars and comments from the author of the thesis.
The second chapter of the thesis consists of the methodological framework. First,
the research framework, along with the research questions and further study ques-
tions, is outlined. Next, the empirical data collection methods are introduced. As
stated above, the thesis mainly consists of data derived from the expert interviews
conducted by the author. Hence, the methodological section describes the process
of data collection. This chapter is concluded by stating possible problems with the
research framework and outlining possible solutions.
After defining the theoretical and methodological approaches, the third chapter
presents the case study of Estonia. Data derived from the expert interviews and
various reports and publications from the Estonian government and the European
Union form the basis of the discussion. In order to answer the posed research
questions, Estonia is firstly categorized according to Inglehart’s groups of state and
society. Second, Estonia’s value set is analyzed. With data derived from Inglehart’s
publications and the Eurobarometer surveys, Estonia’s position on the two value
dimensions is estimated. The third section analyzes gender equality in Estonia, in
terms of legislations and attitudes. A more specific analysis of female representa-
tion in Estonia is discussed in the fourth section. The overall situation is analyzed
first and the three sets of barriers, namely structural, institutional and cultural are
analyzed with the data at hand, second. The fifth section then answers the posed re-
search question of whether and how Inglehart’s theoretical approach can be applied
to the case of Estonia.
The thesis is brought to a close by summarizing the research and stating general
conclusions about the participation of women in the Estonian political sphere.
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1 THE THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework which will be applied in the main
analysis. The theory that will be used throughout this thesis was developed by three
scholars, Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris and Christian Welzel. These scholars have
published numerous pieces based on the World Value Survey. Those publications
are mainly concerned with the impact of modernization on values and the related
cultural shifts. In ‘Gender Equality and Democracy’ published in 2002, which forms
the basis of the present thesis, Inglehart, Norris and Welzel quantitatively trace the
relationships between modernization factors and cultural factors on the percentage
of women in the lower house of parliaments, the level of democracy as well as to
survival/self-expression values. Based on their statistical findings, the scholars for-
mulate their theory in the conclusion of the publication. This theory, which is used
as the theoretical basis of the thesis, states that economic development together
with a society’s cultural heritage, influences a societal shift from survival to self-
expression values. This change is seen as the cause of a higher percentage of women
in parliament, as well as the rise of democratic institutions.
The theoretical chapter is outlined as follows. In Section 1.1, the concept of the
modernization theory is introduced. Section 1.2 will explain the theory developed
by Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris and Christian Welzel (2002) in more detail. In-
gleharts’ perception of gender equality is analyzed in Section 1.3, with a focus on
political participation. In Section 1.4, the unique situation of the post-Communist
Central Eastern European societies is explained. Finally in Section 1.5 criticisms of
the theory will be analyzed.
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1.1 Modernization Theories
The beginnings of modernization theories can be traced back to the 1960’s. These
theories were mainly used to analyze the different development stages of countries
through industrialization and technological development. However, modernization
is not simply a process of economic change, but it also includes changes in “tra-
ditional attitudes, values, and institutions” (Andersen & Taylor, 2010, p. 217).
Modernization theories evolved largely in response to Weber’s assumption that “cul-
tural changes continuously and autonomously affect societies” (Halman & Voicu,
2010, p. 109), since according to Weber, the term ‘hard-working’ is based on values
given through religion, namely Protestantism. Weber indicates that hard-working
societies, especially ones based on Protestant values, benefit from economic devel-
opment, whereas societies that lack such values are poor, not only economically, but
also in terms of attitudes and institutions (Andersen & Taylor, 2010, p. 218). Thus,
it is clear that the formation of modernization theory was based on Western devel-
opments. While societies transform from traditional to modern, ”modernization is a
total social process associated with (or subsuming) economic development in terms
of the preconditions, concomitants, and consequences of the latter” (Bernstein, 1971,
p. 141).
Modernization is a widely discussed topic, especially in terms of value and culture
changes. In the past, two rivaling theories were widely used: Marx’s communist mod-
ernization theory and Smith’s capitalist modernization theory (Inglehart & Welzel,
2005, p. 16-17; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 33). While Marx claims that societal
value change is a reaction to transition in socioeconomics, Smith claims the exact
opposite (Inozemtsev & Dutkiewicz, 2012, p. 123-124). In contrast, Inglehart and
Welzel claim in their revised modernization theory that economic development is the
driving force in value changes in a society, its culture and its politics. More precisely,
they state that “[m]odernization is evolving into a process of human development,
in which socioeceonomic development brings cultural changes that make individual
autonomy, gender equality, and democracy increasingly likely, giving rise to a new
type of society that promotes human emancipation on many fronts” (Inglehart &
Welzel, 2005, p. 1-2).
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1.2 Inglehart’s Modernization Theory
This section introduces Inglehart and Welzel’s revised modernization theory. As
claimed above, economic development is the driving force in value change in society,
culture and politics. Moreover, modernization is strongly connected with industrial-
ization and the movement towards a knowledge based society. Hence, “[o]nce set in
motion, it tends to penetrate all aspects of life, bringing occupational specialization,
urbanization, rising educational levels, rising life expectancy, and rapid economic
growth” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 33). Inglehart emphasizes that in his opinion,
modernization does not equate to Westernization, especially since Western societies
are not the only societies leading modernization in today’s world. Additionally, In-
glehart and Welzel argue that the process of cultural modernization is not linear or
irreversible, but rather path dependent and predictable (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005,
p. 16-17, 46-47; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 33).
Overall, modernization strongly effects cultural changes within a society. First,
the transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society triggers a shift from
traditional to secular-rational values as well as the introduction of bureaucratization
and secularization. And second, the transition to a post-industrial society with
changes from survival to self-expression values. Ingelhart argues that most post-
industrial societies at the same time are functioning democracies. While Inglehart
and Welzel claim that
[d]emocracy is based on the idea that all human beings are valuable,
regardless of biological characteristics such as race and sex [...] The
idea of democracy aims at empowering people as if societies were made
through a social contract between equals, all of whom have the same
potential for making autonomous and responsible choices [...] Thus, any
discrimination based on race or sex conflicts with the democratic idea of
human equality (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 272),
therefore self-expression values support individual autonomy, tolerance and emanci-
pation, especially in terms of equality. Hence, the scholars implicate that the process
of modernization with the shift towards emphasizing self-expression values enhances
gender equality. Furthermore, the emergence of the welfare state also plays a ma-
jor role, as it, for example, “takes on caretaking responsibilities, reducing the risk
of ageing, sickness, unemployment, and homelessness” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005,
p. 278). This results in the transformation of the traditional family structure and
consequently traditional gender roles. The main driving force is indicated to be
economic development, which triggers the shift from agrarian to industrial and then
16
to post-industrial societies. Further, the influence of the opinions of political leaders
of a society and the society’s history itself impact the modernization process. Reli-
gion is another important factor that shapes the transition. Whereas “[a] society’s
cultural tradition has much stronger impact on traditional/secular-rational values”
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 76), the modernization process has a stronger impact
on the survival/self-expression values amongst societies (Inglehart et al., 2002, p.
323; Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 10-11; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 20-21, 25, 277;
Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 36-37).
economic
development
cultural
heritage
shift from
survival towards
self-expression
values
democratic
institutions
higher % 
of women
in parliament
Figure 1.1: Factors conducive to women’s representation in parliament and demo-
cratic institutions (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 342).
Inglehart, Norris and Welzel have developed a theory (see Figure 1.1) explaining
the impact of modernization (specifically economic development) on the proportion
of women in parliament as well as on the level of democracy and democratic in-
stitutions. While first predicting that democracy is responsible for an increase in
the percentage of women in parliament, the scholars detect that both are rather
parallel developments. When economic development leads to change in a society’s
culture, as indicated above, the emphasis of self-expression values, and therefore
gender equality, becomes stronger. The influence on a society’s culture of gender
equality and values in this case, is measured by asking the question: ‘Do men make
better politicians than women?’ Societies with a higher percentage of disagreement
with that statement record higher proportions of women in parliament. Further-
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more, a society’s religious beliefs influences the attitudes towards gender equality
and women in political positions. As Inglehart points out, Protestant countries for
example have the highest proportions of women in parliament, followed by Catholic
countries (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 323-328).
As the definition given by the scholars shows, democracy includes equality amongst
sexes. However, surprisingly, neither is democracy a guarantee for a higher propor-
tion of women in parliament, nor does democracy directly impact it (Inglehart et al.,
2002, p. 342). Both, democratic institutions as well as the proportion of women in
parliament are affected by the change from survival to self-expression values and not
vice versa. This causal link was established mainly through the examination of the
post-Soviet societies. While those societies were quickly introduced to democracy
and democratic institutions, the transition from survival to self-expression values
did not automatically follow. The scholars claim that it seems to be a result of
the economic instability and physical insecurity. Hence, as the emphasis shifts from
survival towards self-expression values the scholars indicate an increase in the pro-
portion of women in parliament (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 328-329, 338, 342). In
order to clarify Inglehart’s hypotheses, the following sections give insights into the
single concepts used throughout his theoretical framework.
The Two Value Dimensions – As indicated before, Inglehart claims that through
modernization, value changes take place in two shifts: first from religious to rational-
secular values through industrialization, and second from survival to self-expression
values through post-industrialization. Therefore both dimensions will be shortly
introduced (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 36).
Traditional societies, which tend to be agrarian, are characterized by a strong
emphasis on religion. Their value set is strongly based on authoritarian and tradi-
tional values. Due to strong religious influence, women have limited rights to decide
over their own body, therefore for example abortion is strictly rejected. In addition,
such societies rank fairly high on national pride. As industrialization increased the
level of productivity, societies became less dependent on nature, while further intro-
ducing “bureaucratization, hierarchy, [and] centralization of authority” (Inglehart &
Welzel, 2009, p. 36). Hence, with the invention of electricity and technology, peo-
ple started to gain more interest in rational beliefs, decreasing the dependency on
theological explanations. Besides more secular values, materialistic interests also in-
creased, which lead to an emphasis on technical and mechanical power. This value
dimension is mainly influenced by the cultural heritage and traditions of a given
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society (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 26-27, 76; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 39) 1
Figure 1.2: Locations of 70 Societies on two dimensions of cross-cultural variation.
The scales on each axis indicate the country’s factor scores on the given
dimension. World Values Surveys, 1990–1991 and 1995–1998 (Inglehart
et al., 2002, p. 331).
Through modernization, industrial societies transition into post-industrial societies.
Consequently, as the emphasis is shifted from an industrial workforce to a service
and knowledge-based workforce, the society’s values change as well. Post-industrial
societies set priorities on knowledge, freedom, emancipation, innovation as well as
material possessions (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 27-28). While economic and phys-
ical security is important to industrial societies, the shift towards “self-expression
values give high priority to freedom of expression, participation in decision making,
political activism, environmental protection, gender equality, and growing tolerance
1For a precise list indicating the difference between traditional and rational-secular values, please
see Table A.1 in Appendix 1
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of ethnic minorities, foreigners, gays and lesbians” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 7).
Such transformation increases interpersonal trust and individual freedom, leading
to the increase of political activism in a society’s value set (Inglehart et al., 2002, p.
343; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 39) 2.
Figure 1.3: Locations of 53 Societies on global cultural map in 2005-2007 (Inglehart
& Welzel, 2010, p. 554).
While Figure 1.2 (on page 19) shows 70 societies on the two value dimensions:
traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression, Figure 1.3 pictures a more
recent cultural map. Protestant societies rank high on secular-rational as well as
self-expression values, showing that those societies have and are post-industrial so-
cieties, while Catholic countries rank lower on both dimensions. Crucially for the
present thesis, Ex-Communist and Baltic societies rank high on the secular-rational
values while showing very low self-expression values. Inglehart indicates that this
is largely due to past oppression as well as to the quick introduction of democracy
after 1991. Figure 1.4 3 (on page 21) shows how 38 societies have shifted over time.
2For a precise list indicating the difference between survival and self-expression values, please see
Table A.2 in Appendix 1
3Note: The 38 countries included are those for which time-series data are available from the
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Most countries show movement towards secular-rational and self-expression values.
However, many ex-communist societies have shown a shift towards survival, as well
as some have moved towards traditional values during the early transition period,
due to the harsh collapse of the Soviet Union.
Figure 1.4: Change Over Time in Location on Two Dimensions of Cross Cultural
Variation for 38 Societies (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 40).
Types of Societies – In order to detect modernization and transition, societies
have to be grouped into different categories. The development of societies is inter-
nationally measured by the Human Development Index4, produced by the United
Nations Development Program from 1998:
earliest to the latest time points in the World Values Surveys.
4The United National Development Program produces annually the Human Development Index,
which is a 100-point scale of societal modernization, comprised of the level of knowledge, health,
and the standard of living (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 21), www.undp.org, www.hdr.undp.org
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• Post-industrial societies: HDI score over .900 and a mean per capita GDP of
$29,585
• Industrial societies: HDI score from .740 to .899 and a mean per capita GDP
of $6,314
• Agrarian societies: HDI score of .739 or below and a mean per capita GDP of
$1,098 (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 21-22).
However, modernization does not automatically lead to democracy, but rather initi-
ates beneficial conditions for the emergence and survival of democracy throughout
the post-industrial phase (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 36-37). Therefore, state-
types also need to be categorized, with the help of the Gastil Index5, which is a
seven-point scale that is commonly used by the Freedom House:
• Older democracies: Freedom House rating 5.5 to 7.0, minimum of 20 years
continuous democracy
• Newer democracies: Freedom House rating 5.5 to 7.0, less than 20 years con-
tinuous democracy
• Semi-democracies: Freedom House rating 3.5 to 5.5, less than 20 years contin-
uous democracy (include transitional democracies)
• Non-democracies: Freedom House rating 1.0 to 3.0 (dictatorships, authoritar-
ian states, oligarchies, monarchies) (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 23-24).
When looking at those categories as a whole, most post-industrial societies live
in older democracies, while most industrial societies live in newer democracies or
semi-democracies. Agrarian societies are largely seen in semi-democracies or non-
democracies.
Additionally, even though the process of modernization is seen as a general trend
within a society, there are differences within each society that cannot be ignored.
Depending on the gender, age, educational background and other factors there are
different groups in each society (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 45).
5Provided by Freedom House. Inglehart revised the scores, hence 7.0 is the highest degree of
freedom in the political rights and civil liberties rating, and 1.0 the lowest
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Economic Development – For several decades numerous scholars have claimed
that economic development will decrease inequality and lead to better living condi-
tions. However, while economic development has benefited human development, it
did not affect the role and position of women in society per se. Nevertheless, “eco-
nomic development is conductive to democracy insofar as it brings specific structural
changes (particularly the rise of the knowledge sector) and certain cultural changes
(particularly the rise of self-expression values)” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 41-42).
Through quantitative analysis, Inglehart shows that economic development is hav-
ing an impact, especially as it enables women to escape the traditional gender role.
Still, it is only one of several factors that play a role in gender equality and the
proportion of women in parliament (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 4-5, 34-35). In
order to measure and use economic development, the Real GDP/capita purchasing
power parity estimates from the World Bank and the United Nations Development
Programme are used by Inglehart, Norris and Welzel (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 327).
Cultural Heritage – Cultural heritage, as indicated by Inglehart, is mainly com-
prised of a society’s religious traditions, as well as cultural legacies and major events
in its past. “Belief systems have a remarkable durability and resilience. While values
can and do change, they continue to reflect a society’s historical heritage” (Inglehart
& Welzel, 2005, p. 20). However, modernization continuously has an effect on a
society’s cultural value set. Through the increase in educational levels (Inglehart &
Norris, 2003, p. 49-51; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 20), rational values are gain-
ing in importance while “becoming familiar with scientific thought and humanistic
ideals” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 38).
As secularization mostly accompanies modernization, the importance of gender
equality can be detected. Even though the role of religion is declining, it will not
vanish completely. In terms of attitudes towards gender equality and women in pol-
itics, religion does have an impact. Leaving other factors aside, in general, Protes-
tant countries show the highest percentage of acceptance of women in politics, while
Catholic and Orthodox countries lie in between Protestant and Islamic societies (In-
glehart et al., 2002, p. 327-328; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 22; Inglehart & Welzel,
2009, p. 37).
Furthermore, shifts towards sexual liberalization can be seen due to secularization.
Sexual liberation includes concepts such as tolerance of abortion, divorce, homosex-
uality, as well as prostitution. Indeed, while agrarian and industrial societies base
their attitudes towards gender equality mainly on religious and moral values, post-
industrial societies, especially amongst the younger generations, give rise to more
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Figure 1.5: Historically Protestant, Historically Catholic, and Historically Commu-
nist Cultural Zones in Relation to Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural
Variation (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 35).
liberal and secular values and perceptions (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 59, 71).
Inglehart has categorized countries according to their cultural beliefs, as shown in
Figure 1.5. He argues that the cultural zones he has outlined are rather persistent
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 19). While the historically communist countries rank
very high on secular-rational values, they seem not to have shifted towards self-
expression values. On the other hand, Protestant countries rank high on secular-
rational values as well as on self-expression values, while African and South Asian
societies rank low on both dimensions.
24
1.3 Gender Equality according to Inglehart
Throughout Inglehart’s analysis, he never explicitly defines what gender equality
really is. Nevertheless, he makes use of a Gender Equality Scale derived from five
items from the World Value Survey and the European Value Survey. The five items
include:
• “On the whole, men make better political leaders that women do.”
• “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.”
• “A university education is more important for a boy than a girl”
• “Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is
this not necessary?”
• “If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn’t want
to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?”
(Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 31).
On the basis of the items above, we can say that Inglehart sees the main criteria of
gender equality to be equal political participation, equal right to occupation and ed-
ucation, and the right to decide over one’s own body. Furthermore, Kristi Andersen
indicates in her book review, that “equal pay for equal work, reproductive rights,
equal educational and employment opportunities, and women’s participation in po-
sitions of authority” (Andersen, 2005, p. 330) belong to Ingleharts’ categorization
of gender equality. Additionally, a “culture of gender equality” (Inglehart & Norris,
2003, p. 8) opens the gates for a successful implementation and execution of given
legal and theoretical strategies to enhance gender equality in practice.
Inglehart’s perception of gender equality and non-discrimination is largely compa-
rable to official definitions of gender equality. The European Union introduced the
concept of gender equality as a fundamental right with the Treaty of Amsterdam
in 1997. From then, several amendments and additions have been made to gender
equality in legal terms. Overall, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union indicates in Article 23 that “Equality between women and men must be
ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality
shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific ad-
vantages in favour of the under-represented sex” (European Commission - Justice,
2011, p. 4). Furthermore, the Council of Europe states that “Gender equality means
an equal visibility, empowerment and participation of both sexes in all spheres of
public and private life [whereas] [i]t requires the acceptance and appreciation of the
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complementarity of women and men and their diverse roles in society” (Council of
Europe, n.d.).
Gender equality is a rather wide concept applicable to many issues. As this
thesis is dealing with the representation of women in parliament, a closer look is
taken into gender equality in political participation in general. It will be shown
how Inglehart and his co-scholars define certain trends universally. Further, the
prediction Inglehart’s theory is stating as it concerns Central Eastern European
post-Communist societies is described.
Attitudes towards Gender Equality – Through the transition from an agricul-
tural to an industrial society women gain access to the workforce. They are entitled
to education, as well as allowed to participate in the political sphere. However, gen-
der equality gains importance primarily through the transition to post-industrialism.
With the diminishing importance of muscular power in economics, and the rising
emphasis on intellect, knowledge and technology, women face even less disadvan-
tages in education, employment and political participation (Inglehart et al., 2002,
p. 323; Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 10-11; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 25, 277).
While the attitudes towards gender equality are generally measured by the previ-
ously introduced five-item Gender Equality Scale, the political ideologies indicating
and influencing the attitudes towards gender equality are measured by a ten-point
scale (left=1, right=10). The left-right placement scale “allows consistent compari-
son within a country at different periods of time, [and] avoids the problem of coding
voting preferences on a left-right scale for parties experiencing rapid change such
as during the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe” (Inglehart &
Norris, 2003, p. 86). This measure is useful in showing changes among different
types of societies, transitions and changes over times as well as differences within a
society (e.g. generational differences).
When measuring the impact of modernization on political ideologies, the three
society groups show significant differences. The gaps between the three groups
are wider than the gender gap within each society itself (Inglehart & Norris, 2003,
p. 45). In agrarian and industrial societies, the traditional gender gap appears,
meaning that women place themselves to the right of men and are hence seen as being
more conservative. This distinct pattern is changed through gender realignment.
Women in agrarian societies are more conservative because of their limited domestic
roles. However, more egalitarian values emerge, increasing the importance of gender
equality, when women gain access to education and work outside the home due to
the modernization process. That transition influences the movement towards the
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modern gender gap, where women place on the left of men (Inglehart & Norris,
2003, p. 75-79, 88-92). Furthermore, generational differences are stronger in post-
industrial societies, though it has to be noted that younger generations are more
egalitarian not only in post-industrial societies, but in general (Inglehart & Norris,
2003, p. 42). Overall, this measurement is mainly used to see where the different
inter-societal groups stand in terms of value changes towards emphasizing gender
equality.
Gender Equality in Political Participation – In terms of political participation,
generally speaking women are less involved. Even though the voting gap tends to
close in post-industrial societies, parties or unions, as well as protest activism are
areas dominated by men. In terms of civic activism, overall the ratio of men and
women involved is rather equal. Nevertheless, a closer look shows that women are
almost solely involved in unpaid volunteer work. Due to the changing values of a
society shifting from agrarian to industrial and then to post-industrial, the gender
gap in political activism and voting tends to get narrower, especially amongst the
younger generations. Furthermore, Inglehart detects that women tend to be almost
as active as men in terms of involvement in political discussions (Inglehart & Norris,
2003, p. 101-126).
In order to represent a society fully, the elected body has to mirror all social groups
in society. Consequently, since the gender gap widens tremendously when looking at
women in politics, one cannot speak about adequate representation of voters if such
an important group of society is underrepresented in elected offices. Even though
women are rather well “mobilized at the grassroots, national, and global levels to
press government agencies and nonprofit organizations” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003,
p. 129), the inclusion of female voices in politics and governments is more difficult.
Generally, Inglehart measures the attitudes towards women in politics according to
the proportion of disagreement to the statement ‘men make better political leaders
than women’ (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 325; Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 127-139,
142).
Figure 1.6 (on page 28) shows the percentage of women in parliament correlated
to the percentage of participants disagreeing that ‘men make better political leaders
than women’. Countries that largely disagree with the statement have a higher per-
centage of women in parliament while societies that tend to agree with the statement
show a lower number of women in parliaments.
Overall, with the help of quantitative measurements, Inglehart defines three sets
of obstacles, which are responsible for the persisting gender gap and the under-
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Figure 1.6: Mass attitudes towards gender equality, and women’s representation in
parliament. (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 276).
representation of women in parliaments. In terms of structural barriers, a higher
socioeconomic level increases the proportion of female politicians. Inglehart indicates
that occupation, level of education, income and factors such as childcare and social
networks need to be taken into consideration for this reason. However, socioeconomic
level has only allowed women more opportunities in the political sphere because
they are more educated and less dependent, rather than automatically guaranteeing
women a say on politics (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 130-131).
Another set of barriers is the institutional setting, which to a certain extent can
also decrease the chances for women. Besides the level of party competition and
the recruitment process, the electoral system is of importance. Thus, “far more
women are commonly elected under proportional party lists than via majoritarian
single-member constituencies” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 132). Additionally
the implementation of institutional measures, more precisely “the use of positive
discrimination or affirmative action strategies such as gender quotas” (Inglehart &
Norris, 2003, p. 145), are considered to increase female representation. Especially
in the process of recruiting candidates, gender quotas have been commonly used
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measures to ensure balance and equality (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 322-323; Inglehart
& Norris, 2003, p. 131-132, 145).
Cultural barriers are mainly grounded in traditional values. Societies relying on
traditional attitudes towards gender equality and women in politics, have a lower
proportion of women in parliament. Those attitudes particularly decrease the like-
lihood of women becoming candidates in an election. Additionally, traditional so-
cieties and their political leaders are less likely to accept and support female can-
didates. Thus, “[c]ultural attitudes may have a direct influence on whether women
are come forward as candidates for office (the supply-side of the equation), and the
criteria used by gate-keeper when evaluating suitable candidates (the demand-side),
as well as having an indirect influence upon the overall inquisitional context, such
as the adoption of gender quotas in party recruitment process” (Inglehart et al.,
2002, p. 322-323). However, post-industrial societies, and especially their younger
generations, are more likely to accept and support female political leaders.
Overall Inglehart concludes, with the help of multivariate analysis, that when
testing the different barriers, unexpectedly only cultural barriers seem to have a
noticeable effect on the proportion of women in elected offices. While the structural
barriers, hence the socioeconomic status, do not seem to have an effect on the
situation, after introducing control variables, Inglehart finds that “neither the type
of electoral system nor the number of parties proves to be an important influence
on the proportion of women in parliament” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 141).
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1.4 The Unique Situations of the
Post-Communist Countries
This section will give insight into the unique situations of the post-Communist
Central Eastern European (CEE) societies. Even though CEE societies are often
grouped together, they are not as homogeneous as might be expected. Especially
since “the post-communist countries are diverse in a historical, cultural and religious
sense, and there are great differences in their transition success: some had a rela-
tively easy transition crowned by EU membership; some are still rife with conflicts
and social uncertainties” (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 29, 113). Nevertheless, general
trends can be detected; ergo single cases will only be named on the basis of extreme
difference. In general, as shown above in Figure 1.2 (on page 19), the CEE societies
rank high on the first but low on the second value dimension. Hence, while being
secular those societies are, at the same time, still emphasizing survival values.
Strong Emphasis on Secular-Rational Values – As Figure 1.7 (on page 31)
shows, CEE societies (Eastern Ex-Communist and Western Ex-Communist societies
6) and in general rank high on secular-rational values. The figure indicates genera-
tional differences on the first value dimension among the five types of societies. CEE
societies rank highest throughout all societal groups mainly due the older genera-
tions being “subjected to powerful campaigns to eradicate religion and traditional
values [and the younger ones to] economic stagnation and declining ideological fer-
vor” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 109).
While the Communist regime tried to eradicate all kinds of religiosity, the Roman
Catholic societies were the least likely of the CEE societies to have responded to
secularization (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 75). More precisely, “some of post-
Communist societies are [even] among the most secular societies” (Inglehart & Nor-
ris, 2003, p. 55). Nevertheless, it was found that the importance of religion grew
after 1990, especially due to the fact that religion had been banned in the Soviet
Union (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 25).
6Inglehart and Welzel define the two societies as such: Western ex-communist societies, “include
ex-communist societies with a Roman Catholic or Protestant heritage, belong to the World
Bank’s middle-income category” (2005, p. 108), while successfully transitioning into market
economies. The “Eastern ex-communist societies include those with an Eastern Orthodox or
Islamic religious heritage, encompassing all of the Soviet successor states (except the three
Baltic republics) plus Albania, Romania, Serbia, and Bosnia” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.
108)
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Figure 1.7: Generational differences in traditional/secular-rational values in five
types of societies. (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 107).
Strong Emphasis on Survival Values – An explanation of the low ranking on the
second value dimension of the CEE countries, namely the survival/self-expression
value dimension, is the collapse of the Soviet Union. After decades of repression,
the sudden dissolution of the economic and political structures brought insecurity
and poverty, leading people to “emphasize economic and physical security [...over...]
values of self-expression, subjective well-being and quality of life” (Halman & Voicu,
2010, p. 110). Furthermore, the position on the second dimension is also very much
dependent on the level of democracy. Thus, “Inglehart and Welzel demonstrate that
if democratic institutions are in place but the emphasis on self-expression values is
weak, democracy tends to be ineffective” (Inglehart et al., 2007, p. 10-11).
Figure 1.8 (on page 32) shows the difference between some of the CEE (here
Western Ex-Communist Societies) societies in 1990 and 2000 in the shift towards self-
expression values compared to the other four society groups, including the remaining
CEE societies that are here defined as Eastern ex-communist societies. While the
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Western ex-communist societies underwent tremendous economic growth through a
successful transition to market economy, the Eastern ex-communist societies faced
more economic instability resulting in a shift towards survival values (Inglehart &
Welzel, 2005, p. 108, 133).
Figure 1.8: Shift towards self-expression values in five types of societies. (Inglehart
& Welzel, 2005, p. 132).
It can be clearly seen that the CEE societies almost ran amongst Developing So-
cieties. While Developing Societies are constantly faced with poverty and are used
to low living standards, after the USSR dissolved the CEE societies suddenly faced
such tremendous changes that led to a substantial increase in the importance of
survival values and stability (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 110; Halman & Voicu,
2010, p. 30, 109-111).
A different picture of the CEE societies in terms of the emphasis on survival values
can be found in newer surveys executed by the European Commission. The Euro-
barometer 77 in 2012 shows that the CEE societies, except for Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania judge the financial situation of their household as good. Furthermore,
while the CEE societies are especially concerned with health and social security,
pensions and the financial situation of their households, issues such as immigration,
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education and environment are seen as secondary 7. When ranking values, the CEE
participants indicate that respect for human rights, human rights themselves, peace
and individual freedom are the most important values. In terms of equality and
trust, the CEE societies rank slightly below the EU 27 average, except for Poland
and Hungary. Therefore, it can be claimed that even though the CEE societies
are not yet on the level of the EU 15 countries, they are clearly shifting towards
self-expression values. Inglehart claims that such change is most likely due to gen-
erational differences, as the younger generations tend to emphasize self-expression
values over survival, especially when growing up in a more secure environment (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2012b, p. T12, T33; European Commission, 2012c, p. 11).
Political Participation and Gender Equality – In general, after the fall of
the USSR, engagement in political parties as well as in labor unions decreased in
CEE societies, due to the fact that people were focused on distancing themselves
from the past. Especially in the Baltic societies where politic lost its importance
tremendously and memberships in labor unions dropped drastically. This trend is
based on the low trust towards political authorities (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 26).
Figure 1.9 pictures the decline in political engagement in the CEE societies.
Figure 1.9: Trends in engagement in political parties in Central Eastern Europe
(Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 34).
In terms of gender equality, CEE societies are not as supportive as other European
7Other EU Member States additionally emphasize education amongst the most important issues.
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societies especially in comparison to the Nordic societies. This can be largely at-
tributed to the concept of gender equality being widely misused in the Soviet Union
(Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 142). In terms of questions concerning the skills and
acceptance of women in leading positions in the economy as well as the political
sphere, the CEE societies do rank beneath the other EU members, however the gap
is closing (European Commission, 2012a, p. 12, 16, 20, 24). Nevertheless, scholars
indicate that “[a] lack of democratic institutions negatively impacts peoples’ gender
attitudes and could explain the survival of traditional gender beliefs even in societies
characterized by a high level of women’s employment” (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p.
257).
Furthermore, a lack of economic development, recession, unemployment, low ed-
ucation, poverty and low social security is hindering gender equality. While men in
general have a less favorable view of gender equality than women, when men are
unemployed, they are even less in favor of the idea. Still, as most CEE societies are
improving their socio-economic situation, a positive development is predicted (Ingle-
hart & Norris, 2003, p. 4; Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 251-257). Furthermore, gender
realignment as is has been defined above, has not yet fully developed in CEE soci-
eties. While strong generational differences in the attitudes towards gender equality
were not detected in the CEE societies, the younger generations are slightly less
traditional than the older ones (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 135, 145).
Gender equality and therefore equal representation in politics is not yet estab-
lished in the CEE societies, as Figure 1.10 (on page 35) shows. This figure shows
the correlation of disagreement with the statement that ‘men make better political
leaders’ and the percentage of women in parliament in CEE societies. It can be
claimed that the less disagreement with the statement there is, the less women in
parliament there are. The decline of women in parliaments in the CEE societies can
be attributed to the fact that during the first free and fair elections that took place
in the CEE societies, the quotas implemented by the Soviet Union were neglected
immediately (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 163). Furthermore, in post-Communist
countries it is important to include the society’s historical traditions, especially “the
different experience of women in the workforce, the widespread use of quotas in
parliaments under the dominance of the Communist party and their subsequent
abandonment” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 142).
Overall, it can be concluded that when it comes to CEE societies, which are all
still undergoing transition, time will tell how and if those societies evolve. These
societies have undergone major changes during the last 20 years, and are still on
the path to becoming post-industrial societies. When analyzing the situation of
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Figure 1.10: Mass attitudes towards gender equality, and women’s representation in
parliament in Ex-Communist Societies (modified by author). (Inglehart
& Welzel, 2005, p. 276).
the CEE societies, the three sets of barriers, structural, institutional and cultural,
need to be assessed. As Inglehart indicates, a higher socio-economic status, level of
education, the political and electoral system as well as a society’s religion and value
set is contributing to the acceptance and percentage of women in parliaments. Even
today, the impact of the Soviet Union is visible when for example analyzing the
perception and attitudes towards gender. Additionally, while some societies might
have felt supported by the European Union through the accession, others are still
struggling with economic development and social security. The theory in question
was developed before most CEE countries became members of the EU, hence it does
not include the influences of the accession to the union.
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1.5 Criticism of Inglehart’s Theory
Ronald Inglehart has written and published numerous texts and books during the
last four decades. Consequently, several scholars have reacted to his work with
critique. This section will aim to give insight into the criticisms of Inglehart’s theory.
Further, criticism relevant to this analysis will be stated by the author, followed by
justifications to use the theory nonetheless.
Even though Inglehart’s theory is not only highly respected but also quite strik-
ing there are some criticisms that have to be evaluated. Inglehart does define the
concepts he uses rather vaguely. In their review of the concept of post-industrialism,
Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson state that the concept is vague and mainly appli-
cable for survey research (Lane & Ersson, 2008, p. 244). Lorien Jasny summarized
several scholars criticizing Inglehart’s approach. First, “the theoretical basis of [In-
glehart’s] argument is not sufficient [...second...] the survey items do not actually
measure what Inglehart claims [...and third...] the method of analysis obscures crit-
ical distinctions” (Jasny, 2012, p. 2). In her paper, she indicates that Inglehart’s
findings connot be substantiated, as she found through her research that the rela-
tionship between values are not verified. Further, the scholars Teorell and Hadenius
criticize that Inglehart and Welzel treat self-expression values as a sort of require-
ment for democracy and that they “fail to distinguish between causal effect and
correlation” (Hadenius & Teorell, 2005, p. 2; Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009, p.
6).
Another striking critique of Inglehart’s definition and application of Postmateri-
alism was published by Haller in 2002. He first states that Inglehart misinterprets
Marx, as his approach trivializes the link between “a society’s technological level
[and its] economic system” (Inglehart, 1997, p. 9; Haller, 2002, p. 140). According
to Haller, the statement should instead be that “social groups who, out of their
interest, and in consideration of technical-economic changes, invent and develop ide-
ologies (‘values’)” (Haller, 2002, p. 140), rather than claiming that only technology
and progress trigger those values. Additionally, Haller strongly emphasizes that
through modernization, economic development and the shift towards Postmaterial-
ism, materialism will not lose its importance. Since people earn more money, more
can be spent on consuming, especially as the industry and service sectors are devel-
oping constantly in order to present new “human needs and desires” (Haller, 2002,
p. 141). And finally, through the shift towards post-industrialism and hence Post-
materialism, people tend to have more free time that can be spent on non-essential
goods and services.
Kristi Andersen’s review of Inglehart and Norris’ book ‘The Rising Tide’ criticizes
36
that the authors did not take into account that development and modernization
do not always solely provide a more favorable platform for women to enter the
workforce and political arena. She emphasizes that particularly in the case of the
post-Communist Central Eastern European societies, while women may have various
opportunities, on the other hand women’s engagement in politics sunk tremendously,
and also the social security system broke away. Similarly, through industrialization,
Andersen states that while new opportunities arise for women, “it may also weaken
the support networks provided by extended families” (Andersen, 2005, p. 332).
Further, Inglehart and Norris are blamed for underestimating and failing to show
the impact of“strong women’s movement [that] may hasten changes in public opinion
(not to mention public policy)” (Andersen, 2005, p. 332) while emphasizing cultural
factors as prerequisites for gender equality.
Besides the criticism mentioned, the author of this thesis needs to further evaluate
certain shortcomings of Inglehart’s theory at use. First, as stated above, Inglehart
does not clearly define his concepts. As it can be seen in the case of gender equality,
Inglehart does not provide a clear definition, but instead only lists a set of items in
order to indicate the attitudes towards the acceptance of gender equality. Addition-
ally, since his theory includes almost all societies, it can be argued that it is greatly
generalized and simplified.
While Inglehart’s approach might be valid for most societies, unique cases seem
to be overlooked. While the theory acknowledges intermediate steps between the
modernization of values and the eventual outcome of increased opportunities for
women, it does not fully take into account the political and economic background.
One could even claim that the theory is rather Western and ‘first world’ oriented,
and as such mainly works in explaining the past developments in currently post-
modern societies, and consequently, seems to be inadequate in predicting future
developments.
Nonetheless, this theory seems to be suitable for the purposes of this thesis. While
Inglehart shows a generalized transition process, this case study will evaluate if the
introduced approach will also be applicable to a unique case, such as the case of
Estonia. Although Inglehart’s vagueness and the lack of given definitions might hin-
der a precise examination of Inglehart’s predicted transition, this vagueness actually
might also give the author the opportunity to show its universality by applying the
theory to a specific case such as Estonia is, and then narrowing the approach by
giving definitions.
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2 METHODOLOGY
This chapter will provide insight into the methodological approach of this thesis. In
Section 2.1 the research framework will be introduced. The main research questions
are stated together with several essential sub-questions that are needed to include all
necessary factors for the discussion and analysis. The primary and secondary data
used throughout the thesis to solve the research question will be named in Section
2.2, with a specific look into interviews as a qualitative data method. Finally, Section
2.3 discusses the problems and obstacles with the research design.
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2.1 Research Framework
The main aim of this thesis is to see if and how Inglehart’s revised modernization
theory can explain the under-representation of women in the Riigikogu. Further, the
extend of the role of the European Union accession will be examined, especially as it
relates to the implementation of the aquis communautaire. Hence, a research design
needs to be developed according to which the research question will be analyzed.
After developing the theoretical framework in the previous chapter, the research aim
is as follows:
Research Questions – The research questions that will be analyzed later on are
as follows:
How can the under-representation of women in the Riigikogu
be explained by Inglehart’s revised modernization theory? If
this cannot be explained by Inglehart, what is the theory
lacking?
Study Questions – In order to answer the posed research questions, several sets of
study questions have to be presented in the research framework. In the theoretical
framework, it was shown that Inglehart’s theory emphasizes the importance of a so-
ciety’s cultural heritage. Hence, in order to analyze the cultural heritage of Estonia,
additional questions such as ‘Does religion play a role in shaping Estonia’s cultural
heritage?’, ‘What other factors shape Estonia’s cultural heritage?’ as well as ‘Does
Estonia’s Soviet experience influence today’s under-representation of women in the
Riigikogu, and if so, how?’, have to be addressed. These questions aim at finding
out whether Inglehart’s strong emphasis on religion is present in the case of Estonia
and if so, if it is as influential as predicted, or if other factors overshadow the role
of religion.
However, as Estonia became a member of the European Union in 2004, an impor-
tant aspect is the inclusion of the changes undergone during the accession period.
Not only was the aquis communautaire implemented, but constant policies, laws, as
well as other changes initiated by the European Union have to be transcribed into do-
mestic settings. Therefore, an important questions that has to be answered is ‘How
did and does the accession to the European Union influence the under-representation
of women in the Riigikogu?’.
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As indicated in the theoretical framework, Inglehart defines three sets of barriers that
restrict women from entering the political sphere. While economic development and
the influence of cultural heritage and outside events such as the EU accession predict
and influence a society’s path towards more female representation, those barriers and
their impact have to be analyzed.
In order to examine the structural barriers, the question ‘What are the main ob-
stacles women face in terms of their socioeconomic situation?’ has to be answered.
The analysis of the socioeconomic situation includes occupation, education and con-
cepts such as the gender pay gap and parental leave. High levels of education and
balanced occupation hint at a society favoring self-expression values and hence the
belonging to either developing industrial societies or post-industrial societies. How-
ever, a large gender pay gap and a ‘one-sided’ parental leave indicate traditional
values and inequality.
As for institutional barriers the electoral and political systems are of importance.
Therefore, questions such as ‘What kind of political and electoral system does Estonia
have?’, as well as ‘Does the recruitment criteria create a burden for women?’ have
to be analyzed in order to see if Inglehart’s predictions stand in the case of Estonia.
The third set of barriers, namely cultural barriers, connect to the study ques-
tions above concerning Estonia’s past. In order to examine the case of Estonia,
the question ‘Where on Inglehart’s cultural map is Estonia situated?’ needs to be
answered. Furthermore, as it will be shown, the examination of attitudes towards
gender equality on its own does not always accurately reflect the actual situation in a
society, therefore, when examining the second value dimension the concept of sexual
liberalization can help in forming a more accurate picture. As Inglehart indicates,
sexual liberalization includes the acceptance of concepts such as divorce, pre-marital
relationships, abortion, gender equality and homosexuality. Therefore, the question
‘To what extent is sexual liberalization an indicator for the acceptance of egalitarian
values?’ needs to be analyzed.
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2.2 Primary and Secondary Data
In order to analyze the research questions posed, a variety of sources are used. First,
primary and secondary sources set the basis in establishing the case of Estonia. As
not much research has been done in the field of female representation in the Riigikogu,
the author chose to use interviews to collect the needed information.
Sources – Throughout this thesis, a variety of secondary sources will be used. The
sources will be mainly in English, nevertheless some Estonian language publications
are used as well. The secondary data used for the theoretical framework is comprised
of publications by Inglehart, fellow scholars and their critics. In order to complete the
analysis, statistical data was included. Furthermore, topic specific books contribute
to the case study. Reports issued by the Estonian government, Estonian institutions,
the European Union, and other international organizations complete the research.
Qualitative Methods – The qualitative method in use is the analysis of semi-
structured interviews. Hence, this section will shortly explain why the method of
interviewing was chosen. Further, how the sample of interviewees was derived, how
the interviews were conducted and what questions were asked, will be discussed
Additionally, an explanation of how the material is used in this thesis follows.
The method of interviewing was chosen specifically due to the lack of a sufficient
amount of publications in English and German on the topic at stake. Furthermore,
in order to gain as much insight as possible, interviewing experts in the field of
gender equality in Estonia seems to be the most striking methodological approach.
Not only is it possible to ask questions that texts and books might not answer as
clearly, but additionally, interviewing gives the interviewer the chance to dig deeper
and ask more precise questions if needed.
The interviewees were chosen according to their profession and expertise. The web
pages of both Tartu and Tallinn University were searched in order to collect a contact
list of experts. Further, the web pages of known women’s non-profit organizations
were searched for experts and volunteer contact’s. Additionally, the Sotsiaalminis-
teerium’s (Ministry of Social Affairs) web page provided the necessary contacts of
the members of the Gender Equality Department, as well as other necessary officials.
A further group of interviewees contacts were gained from the Riigikogu web page,
namely the chairperson, as well as the two vice chairpersons of each Fraktioonid,
and the members of the Sotsiaalkomisjon.
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Around 30 interview inquiries in English were sent out to the different experts, asking
for an in-person, Skype or mail interview. Another 40 interview inquiries were sent
to the Riigikogu members and the bureaus of the Fraktioonid, asking for a written
answer to a narrower question set. During the following months, approximately 15
answers from experts, and 4 answers from Members of the Riigikogu were received.
The experts were provided with the question set beforehand, to allow them to gain
more insight of the interview. Meetings in Tartu and Tallinn were arranged with
the interviewees. Each interview, depending on the number of interviewees at each
interview lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours 30 minutes. The interviews were
fully recorded and the interviewer took notes in order to ask additional questions.
Furthermore, anonymity was guaranteed to all participants.
The final composition of the interviewees consisted of:
• two officials, representing the Sotsiaalministeerium
• one expert, working independently as an advisory body
• three experts who used to work for the Sotsiaalministeerium
• four experts from different Estonian women’s non-profit organizations and po-
litical party’s women’s organizations, as well as also partially active in political
arena
• two experts, working and teaching at Estonian Universities in the field of
gender equality
The interviewees were all female and of different age groups. All interviews were
conducted in English, even though in some cases, some Estonian words were used,
and later translated by the interviewer.
Throughout the interviews, the interviewer asked the same open-ended questions
of each interviewee. Additionally, sub-questions were asked when the interviewer felt
it was needed. The questions were grouped according to different topics, as follows:
• First, questions about gender equality itself.
• Second, questions about the situation in Estonia’ political sphere and espe-
cially the topic of women in the Riigikogu.
• Third, questions identifying cultural barriers.
• Fourth, questions about Estonia’s past.
• Fifth, questions about culture and religion.
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• Sixth, questions about the influence of accession to the European Union.
The interview data will be used to analyze Inglehart’s revised theory in the case of
Estonia. The following analysis is mainly based on the data collected from the expert
interviews. Hereafter, the information gathered will be analyzed topic-wise, in order
to see how the different groups of experts differ in their approach and perceptions of
the situation of women in Estonia’s political sphere. Nevertheless, as the subsequent
part will show, most of the experts represent several positions.
Due to anonymity, each expert was numbered, and hereafter will be referred to
by the number. The first expert represents an advisory independent position. Ex-
perts 2 and 3 are representatives of the Sotsiaalminsteerium, precisely of the Gender
Equality Department. Experts 4, 5 and 6 are former employees of the Sotsiaalmin-
isteerium. These experts still take part in public discussion of gender equality, and
occasionally act as advisory bodies for authorities. Furthermore, they are active
in non-governmental organizations, providing and executing projects that include
training and workshops to promote gender equality. Expert 7 and Expert 8 work
at Tallinn University. Experts 9, 10 and 11 are active members of women’s NGOs.
Expert 12 is a politician.
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2.3 Problems with the Research Design
The problems and obstacles of the research design are discussed in this section.
Furthermore, solutions to those problems will be given. An overall choice of sources
should show the author’s objectivity.
Initially a quantitative data chapter was planned, in order to give statistical insight
into the case of Estonia. Unfortunately the main variables used by Inglehart were
either not available, incomplete or outdated. Hence, it was not possible to make valid
comparisons. Therefore, the quantitative methods used compromised of established
statistical data, which was interpreted by the author.
Since interviewing was chosen as the main data collection method, language and
communication proved to be obstacles. English was neither the mother tongue of
the majority of interviewees, nor the interviewer. For this reason, it was offered
to conduct the interview in English, German, or Estonian with an interpreter if
needed. All interviewees chose to use English as the interview language; therefore,
misunderstandings might have slightly distorted the outcome. Additionally, not
all interviewees answered all of the questions due to a lack of knowledge or other
reasons.
Furthermore, the small sample of 12 interviewees may not cover all aspects and
opinions. Especially as only a few of the politicians contacted agreed to fill out
the survey but in the end never did, their perspective of the question at hand is
not covered. Potential reasons for the low response rate of politicians might be the
sensitive topic at hand or the fact that the interview inquiries were sent in English.
Hence, one might think that the approach is one-sided. Nevertheless, as many of
the interviewees have been active in the political sphere, it can be claimed that the
approach is fairly balanced.
Likewise, it can be argued that since all interviewees were female, the male per-
spective is missing. However, the list of Estonian gender experts is rather narrow,
and consist mainly of female experts. Hence, it was not possible to take the intervie-
wee’s gender into account. Finally, during the analysis of the interview data, again
language as well as objectivity obstacles might occur. Nevertheless, special care is
given to those issues.
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3 THE CASE OF ESTONIA
While claiming that economic development along with the cultural heritage influ-
ences and triggers a value shift from survival to self-expression values and conse-
quently increases the proportion of women in parliaments, Inglehart, Norris and
Welzel also indicate that three sets off barriers appear. This chapter will analyze
the situation of Estonia through examining existing barriers according to Ingle-
hart’s approach. The data used throughout the analysis is mainly collected from
semi-structured interviews with Estonian gender experts. As indicated in the meth-
ods chapter, 12 experts were interviewed and hereafter will be referred to by the
assigned number. The interview data is compared to scholarly articles and publica-
tions about Estonia’s path towards gender equality and higher female representation
as well as to statistical findings from several reports.
The first Section assesses Estonia’s position in terms of modernization and democ-
racy according to Inglehart’s criteria that were defined in the theoretical framework.
In Section 3.2, Estonian values, as they pertain to this study, are assessed and ex-
amined. Section 3.3 introduces and analyzes the situation of gender equality in
Estonia, followed by the assessment of the situation of female representation in the
Riigikogu in Section 3.4. Further, the three sets of barriers, structural, institutional
and cultural are examined respectively while emphasizing the influences of the So-
viet Union and the European Union. Section 3.5 analyzes whether, based on the
previous findings, Inglehart’s theoretical approach is applicable.
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3.1 Estonia – State and Society
In order to group countries according to their developments and situations, Ingle-
hart’s categorization was introduced above. In the case of Estonia, in 2003 Inglehart
claimed that it is an industrial society with a newer democracy. His assumptions are
based on Human Development Index (HDI) scores, GDP per capita and Freedom
House scores. The following tables show Estonia’s scores respectively.
Table 3.1: HDI scores from 1990 until 2012 (United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, 2013).
year 1990 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
HDI score .728 .786 .830 .836 .841 .842 .837 .839 .844 .846
Inglehart claims that societies with a HDI score between .740 to .899 and a mean
per capita GDP of $6,314 are industrial societies. Thus, as Table 3.1 shows, Estonia
has remained in the category of industrial societies according to the HDI scores,
since those scores have remained between .786 and .846 between 2000 and 2012.
An indicator for a growing economy is the GDP per capita, as Inglehart claims.
Therefore, Table 3.2 shows how Estonia’s GDP per capita has increased during the
last 20 years. While it has increased steadily throughout the years, the economic
crisis can be detected in Estonia’s GDP per capita in the decrease in 2009 and 2010.
Nevertheless, Estonia’s GDP has risen above the target number Inglehart has set for
industrial countries. Henceforth, it can be argued that according to the HDI score
Estonia remains an industrial society with a rising GDP that has not yet reached
the target of post-industrial societies.
Table 3.2: GDP per capita (ppp) in US$ from 2000 until 2012 (United Nations De-
velopment Programme, 2012).
year 2000 2005 2006 2007
GDP per capita 11,513 16,548 18,253 19,648
year 2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP per capita 18,941 16,246 16,615 17,885
In terms of Estonia’s democracy, Inglehart claimed in 2003 that it falls under newer
democracies as its Freedom House rating was between 5.5 and 7.0, as well as having
less than 20 years of continuous democracy. Table 3.3 (on page 47) shows that
Estonia has improved according to the Freedom House scores. While until 1995, it
46
had scores under 6, Estonia has since then scored over 6 and from 2004 onwards
it has the highest score of freedom in the political rights and civil liberties ratings
by Freedom House. Estonia has been continuously under democratic rule, ergo it
can be claimed that it does not fit in the category of newer democracies any more
since Inglehart’s definitions from 2003 of the categories seem to be outdated. As ten
years have passed since then, a new branding of categories is warranted in order to
make coherent and contemporary definitions of the different kinds of democracies.
In any case, it can be claimed that even though in comparison to ‘older democracies’
Estonia has only faced 20 years of continuous democracy, it ranks higher than most
of the other Central Eastern European societies.
Table 3.3: Freedom House scores from 1991 until 2012 (Freedom House, 2013; Lau-
ristin, 2011, p. 148-189).
year 1991 1992 1993/1994 1995 1996-2003 2004-2012
Freedom House score 5.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7
When comparing Estonia to other societies in terms of modernization, the distri-
bution of the labor force has to be taken into consideration. As Inglehart claims,
societies move from agrarian to industrial and then towards service and knowledge
based societies. In the case of Estonia, the biggest labor force is comprised of the
service and knowledge sector. A statistic 1 from Statistics Estonia has been used to
give more detailed insight into the approximate distribution of labor in the three cat-
egories, agrarian, industrial and service (Statistics Estonia, 2013). It can be claimed
that one reason for the outcome is that Estonia is known for its strong IT sector.
1For the entire table, please see Table A.3 in Appendix 2
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3.2 The Estonian Value Set
The cultural map developed by Inglehart was already introduced in the theoretical
framework of this thesis. In order to see Estonia’s development, the graph was
modified by the author, as Estonia’s position in the year 2000 was added (blue mark
2). Unfortunately, newer measurements of Estonia after 2000 have not yet been
published, thus the development can only be estimated.
Figure 3.1: Change Over Time in Location on Two Dimensions of Cross Cultural
Variation for Estonia 1990 until 2000 (modified by author) (Inglehart &
Baker, 2000, p. 40; World Value Survey, 2013).
Figure 3.1 shows Estonia’s position on the two value dimensions in the years 1990,
1996 and 2000. Throughout those 10 years, Estonia ranks relatively high on the
traditional/secular-rational value dimension, compared to other Central Eastern Eu-
ropean societies. Hence, as Heidmet’s claims in the Estonian Human Development
2Data for the year 2000 was derived from WVS homepage. The numbers for the two dimensions
were included on the graph resulting in the blue dot (Inglehart & Welzel, n.d.).
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Report of 2006, Estonians are not emphasizing “values related to religion, author-
ity, patriotism, etc” (Heidmets, 2007, p. 114). Nevertheless, after the break up
of the Soviet Union, Estonia underwent a time of so called Romanticism. After
re-establishing independence, Estonia was striving to be the independent Estonia it
had been in the 30s, as claimed by all the interview partners. As a result, traditional
and more conservative values prevailed. The model of the male breadwinner and the
supportive female home-maker (1,2,3,7) was reinforced. Staying at home and raising
children was glorified (4), especially being a rather small society, Estonia feared be-
coming a ‘dying nation’ (5,6,8). As one expert states, even specific domestic schools
were opened for women to attend (12). Nevertheless, the traditional family model
was not compatible with the economic situation, resulting in a rather quick return
of women to the work force (3,7). Therefore, as the Human Development Report of
2010/2011 indicates, while being more secular nowadays Estonians “conceive fam-
ily roles in a less traditional way and display the individualistic, autonomous, and
achievement-orientated understanding of their role in society” (Lauristin, 2011, p.
29). On the other hand, as some interviewees claimed, Estonia, and mainly the
elite, were longing to return to Europe and join the European Union as that meant
distancing themselves from Russia (6,8).
While Estonia‘s position on the first value dimension during those years is un-
changed, when looking at the second value dimensions an initial decrease and sub-
sequent increase can be seen. Compared to other European countries, Estonia has
been lagging behind in terms of self-expression values. Tolerance, trust and free-
dom of speech have not been emphasized by the Estonian society. Rather, survival
values and materialism have been considered to be more important. Contrary to In-
glehart’s theoretical approach, Estonia moved towards survival values after regaining
independence. Liina Ja¨rviste indicates that the dominance of survival values after
the re-independence can be explained by the large scale changes in the structure of
the Estonian society and economy by the sudden break away from the Soviet system
(Ja¨rviste, 2010a, p. 15).
After all, as Figure 3.1 shows, the Estonian society has been moving towards
favoring self-expression values since 1996. However, while on the one hand 63%
of Estonian Eurobarometer participants claim that the financial situation of their
household is good and they are satisfied, on the other hand, 59% think that the sit-
uation of the national economy is totally bad (39% say it is totally good) (European
Commission, 2012b, p. 7, T12). In terms of emphasizing values, the Eurobarome-
ter 77 shows that while the Estonian participants emphasized ‘Respect for human
life’ (48%), ‘Human rights’ (43%), ‘Peace’ (42%) and even ‘Tolerance’ (21%), values
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such as ‘Equality’ (13%) and ‘Religion’ (2%) were amongst the least important val-
ues (European Commission, 2012c, p. 11). Hence, these diverse perceptions do not
indicate clearly if the Estonian society is decisively moving towards the emphasis of
self-expression values.
As Postmaterialism is clearly an indicator for self-expression values, the inter-
viewees were asked their opinion. When asking the interviewees, if Estonia should
be considered materialist or Postmaterialist, Estonia was either positioned on the
materialist side (3,5,10), or in between both (4), as one respondent pointed out
“I consider Estonia generally materialist, with some ‘pockets’ of Postmaterialism”
(8). Further, several interviewees accentuate that due to poor economic conditions,
mainly because of the economic crisis, but also poverty, Estonia is still emphasizing
survival values (3,4). Ja¨rviste indicates that the richer a society becomes, the more
the quality of life goes up, whereas the change to capitalism after the Soviet Union’s
collapse triggered the demand for material goods (Ja¨rviste, 2010a, p. 15). Andrus
Saar claims that the rather slow shift towards self-expression values “means that the
number of people in the society for whom values related to economic and physical
security are of primary importance is decreasing (since these values have already
been achieved), and therefore subjective wellbeing, opportunities for self-expression
and the quality of life are becoming more important for them” (Lauristin, 2010, p.
108).
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3.3 Gender Equality in Estonia
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the topic of gender equality was not a pri-
ority and rather silenced. Despite this, soon after gaining re-independence, Estonia
adopted and implemented international agreements on gender equality and human
rights. The Constitution that was ratified in 1992 included a non-discrimination
clause on grounds of sex. However, Estonia’s society as well as government did not
emphasize the importance of the concept and idea of gender equality after all, as it
was indicated by the Human Development Report of 2006: “Regrettably, the entire
subject of equality has been actively handled by only a relatively small group in Es-
tonia, while the rest of society has hesitantly ignored the matter”(Heidmets, 2007, p.
110). As an example in 2009, 52% of the Estonian participants of the Special Euro-
braometer 326 stated that gender inequality in Estonia is ‘rare’ (Directorate-General
for Communication, 2010, p. 10).
In Estonia, the definition and concept of gender equality is largely not understood,
based on the negative imprint that is left from the Soviet regime, as all interview
partners indicated. Tiina Raitviir even claims that the concept of gender equality
is an ‘alien’ concept for the Estonian society (Raitviir, 2011, p. 126). In the past,
gender equality had meant that “everybody was equally poor, everybody had the
same standard on living, everybody had the same chances, everybody was provided
a job by the state. So it was equality [...] We had full equality and no one actu-
ally put meaning to that, it was just declared” (6). In the Soviet Union, gender
was widely disregarded, “[t]here were neither women nor men: just comrades, the
working class and its historical opponents” (Pilvre, 2000, p. 61). Women worked
and earned as much as men, while at the same time having full responsibility over
the household. Furthermore, women were even rewarded for giving birth to a large
number of children. In terms of politics, women were as much a part as men, due to
the existing quotas for the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Women’s Committee. De-
spite of being able to be heard, women in general did not speak up as women or for
women (Pilvre, 2000, p. 60-62; Laas, 2005, p. 108). Further, as Laas indicates, “[i]n
reality, there were not any women in leading positions in the Communist Party or
the Supreme Soviet” (Laas, 2005, p. 108). A common answer to the question of what
was gender equality in the Soviet Union, several experts immediately mentioned the
picture of women driving tractors (4,5,8,11). In contrast to this, the majority of the
interviewees claimed that as a basic human right and the basis of democracy, gender
equality as it should be understood today actually includes equal rights, obligations,
opportunities but also equal responsibilities (1,2,4,5,6,8,9,10,11).
According to Inglehart’s measurements of the left-right scale, women are on the
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Figure 3.2: Gender Equality Scale by nation (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 33).
left of men, and hence less conservative than men 3 (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p.
82). When asking the interviewees about the position of women, all claimed that
women in Estonia are more liberal, as well as more open, tolerant and supportive
towards gender equality (1-11). However, the rejection, silencing as well as the
misunderstanding of gender equality as an issue by the Estonian society, can be
3For position on related scale, see Figure A.1 in Appendix 2
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detected in the low ranking of Estonia on Inglehart’s Gender Equality Scale in
Figure 3.2 4 (on page 52).
When asking the interviewees why gender equality would or might be important
for Estonia several different answers were given. The economy would benefit from
gender equality if the potential of every person is maximized (1,2,6,8), therefore ed-
ucating women and then letting their resources go to waste would negatively affect
the economy (Heidmets, 2007, p. 110). Further, through gender equality the gender
pay gap in Estonia, which is the largest in the European Union, could be reduced
(4,10,11). While both, men and women, should get the same benefits without gen-
dered barriers (1), gender equality at the same time enforces democracy (9). And
finally, since men and women have different value systems, and life experiences, a bal-
ance should be established in order for women to be equally presented (5,10). While
Estonian men often claim that Estonian society is equal, women see the beneficial
position of men, especially when women have higher levels of education (Ja¨rviste,
2010a, p. 16).
One part of the emerging push for gender equality was due to the establishment
of women’s organizations in the early 90s in Estonia. While a radical women’s
movement was missing, largely because of the perception that women are not dis-
criminated against as they are part of the non-domestic labor market (Pilvre, 2000,
p. 60), women nevertheless organized in order to voice their needs and concerns.
With the help in terms of human and monetary resources from the Nordic coun-
tries a network of women’s organizations was established (1,5,6,11). Unfortunately,
even though monetary resources are available for women’s organizations, the hur-
dles of bureaucracy and co-funding restrict the work of the organizations. Thus,
the women’s organizations’ work is mainly based on projects (4,5,6). Nevertheless,
associations representing women’s interests (56%) are seen as the main contribu-
tors to promoting gender equality in Estonia, next to Equality organizations (41%)
(Directorate-General for Communication, 2010, p. 112). In contrast, so far, the
political parties fail to spell out the need to remove existing gender inequalities in
their party platforms. Hence, gender equality is still seen as somehow secondary in
the field of politics, and often it is even claimed that it is a women’s thing (Raitviir,
4Combined 100-point scale of the following 5 items: MENPOL Q118: ”On the whole, men make
better political leaders than women do.” (Agree coded low); MENJOBS Q78: ”When jobs are
scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” (Agree coded low); BOYEDUC
Q119: ”A university education is more important for a boy than a girl.” (Agree coded low);
NEEDKID Q110 ”Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is
this not necessary?” (Agree coded low); SGLMUM Q112 ”If a woman wants to have a child as
a single parent but she doesn’t want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve
or disapprove?” (Disapprove coded low). Source: WVS/EVS, pooled 1995–2001.
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2011, p. 142-144).
Starting from 2000 onwards Estonia increased the emphasis on legal acts concern-
ing Gender Equality due to the imminent accession to the European Union. At the
same time “Estonia ratified the Amended and Revised European Social Charter”
(Jaigma, 2008, p. 7). This action gave rise to the debate on gender issues and
the inclusion of gender equality in “national policies, programs and projects as a
long-term objective” (Jaigma, 2008, p. 7). However in 2002 Anu Laas criticized the
backwardness of Estonia’s gender equality development. Not only had the imple-
mentations been rather unsuccessful, but in terms of the rising gender pay gap wage
discrimination on the grounds of gender was not seen in a negative light (Laas, n.d.).
With the accession to the EU, Estonia ratified the Gender Equality Act on May
1st, the day it became a member state. The Act meant to “ensure respect for
the principle of equal treatment and to promote gender equality as a fundamental
human right and a general good in all areas of social life [Furthermore, the] act
prohibits discrimination based on sex in the public as well as the private sector, and
obliges state and local government agencies, educational and research institutions
and employers to promote gender equality” (Sepper & Linntam, 2005, p. 7). This
clause was the first official definition of ‘gender equality’, ‘equal treatment’, ‘sexual
harassment’ and ‘the principle of shared burden of proof’. Despite implementing
the necessary European legislation on gender equality, Estonia made no efforts to
purposely enhance the movement towards equality (Sepper & Linntam, 2005, p. 7,
14). A major claim that all the interviewees made is that without the EU accession,
even today Estonia would most likely neither have the Gender Equality Act from
2004, nor the Equal Treatment Act from 2009.
In terms of institutional changes, the Department of Gender Equality, responsible
for policies and implementation monitoring, and the Gender Equality Council, acting
as an advisory body, were set up in the Sotsiaalministeerium. In addition, the
position of a Gender Equality Commissioner was established (Sepper & Linntam,
2005, p. 19-21). The Gender Equality Commissioner acts as “an independent and
impartial expert who acts independently and monitors the implementation of the
GEA” (Sepper & Linntam, 2005, p. 20-21).
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3.4 Female Under-Representation in Estonia
In the political arena in Estonia, gender equality is far from being fully established.
During the last 20 years, the percentage of women elected to the Riigikogu has not
gotten close to the percentage of men. Table 3.4 shows the percentages of female
candidates and the actual percentage of women elected to the European Parliament,
the Riigikogu as well as the Local Government Councils. For the European parlia-
ment, the elections in 2004 and 2007 show that even though the percentage of female
candidates was below 30%, 2 out of 6 MEPs are female. On the national level, the
numbers are lower. While the percentage of women in the Riigikogu increased, af-
ter 2007, the percentage dropped by 5 percent points, from 24.8% to 19.8%, at the
same rate as the percentage of female candidates. On the local level the scores are
somewhat higher, with a positive trend of an increase in women by over 6% from
1993 to 2009. However, when comparing the percentage of female candidates to the
actual percentage of women in the political parties, women constitute about half
of the members, in some parties even over 50% (Ministry of Social Affairs of the
Republic of Estonia, 2004, p. 10). The number of female members rose in particular
from about 45,5% (range from 60,2% to 28%) in 1998 to 48% (range from 60% to
35%) in 2002, and in 2011 to 50,9% (range from 58,2% to 45,5%) (Raitviir, 2011, p.
145).
Table 3.4: Female Candidates and Elected Members of the European Parliament,
the Riigikogu and Local Government Councils (Raitviir, 2011, p. 149,
151; Eero, 2012, p. 12,13)
.
year 2004 2009
% EP candidates 24.2 29.7
% EP elected 33.3 33.3
year 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
% R candidates 14.0 17.7 26.9 21.4 27.1 22.6
% R elected 12.9 11.9 17.8 18.8 23.8 19.8
year 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2009
% local candidates 28.3 33.0 35.6 37.7 39.3 38.7
% local elected 23.9 26.6 28.3 28.4 29.6 29.6
The special Eurobarometer 75.1 displays that in the case of Estonia, the main reason
(47%) why women are under-represented in politics, according to the participants
of the survey, is that ‘The political world is dominated by men who do not value the
skills of women enough’. A lack of interest to pursue a career in politics (35%), persis-
tent stereotypes (26%), more interest in local politics (26%), disadvantaged positions
(22%), ineffective measures to encourage parity between women and men (18%,) as
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well as the media’s attitude towards women during elections (15%), were further
barriers (European Parliament, 2011, p. 20). Additionally, women are claimed to
have less confidence and self-esteem, and are less willing to take risks (12), espe-
cially the risk of entering the political sphere where one is displayed in public (Laas,
2005, p. 106). Ergo, the consequences of mainly having “one social group in power”
(8), namely men, as the interviewees agreed on, constitutes unbalanced decision-
making, since this does not reflect Estonia’s demographic situation. By not taking
the female perspective into consideration, “Estonian politics and policies are very
masculine value based” (5), especially since women have different life experiences.
Another effect emphasized by the interviewees is the lack of female role models en-
couraging women to first of all get active in politics, and second to strive for lead
positions in politics. As the interviewees representing the Social Ministry claim,
projects are being planned in order to mentor and encourage women to enter the
political sphere (2,3). Further, Estonian women’s NGOs provide training (5,6,9,10).
Training and supportive measures encouraging women to become active in politics
is also seen as the most effective measure amongst the Estonian participants of the
Eurobarometer 75.1, as 41% favor it.
According to Inglehart’s measurements of egalitarian attitudes towards women
in politics Estonia raked fairly low. Figure 3.3 5 (on page 57) shows that only
around 19 % disagreed with the statement that ‘men make better political leaders
than women’. However, the measure of this variable is over 10 years old. As a
note, the Estonian gender monitoring report of 2009 displays that 49% of the female
respondents think that the percentage of women in the Riigikogu should be bigger
and in 2005, 40%. 33% of the male respondents though that gender is not important
when it comes to the composition of the Riigikogu, while 32% were in favor of more
female representatives (Vainu et al., 2010, p. 136-137). On the local level, the
responses of the participants were almost the same, as Figure 3.4 (on page 58)
shows. By contrast, according to the Estonian participants in the Special Gender
Equality Barometer in 2009, 53% claimed that the low number of female MPs does
not need to be treated urgently, while only 41% indicated that urgent changes should
be made (Directorate-General for Communication, 2010, p. 96). Therefore it can be
claimed that even though the number of female politicians in Riigikogu has not risen
tremendously, the attitudes towards women in politics have become more accepting.
In order to detect differences in the attitudes towards women in the political
sphere, the experts were asked to identify differences in terms of ethnicity and ur-
5Note: ‘Men make better political leaders than women’ (% Disagree). Source: Pooled WVS/EVS,
1995-2001
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Figure 3.3: Egalitarian Attitudes towards Women in Politics (Inglehart & Norris,
2003, p. 137).
ban/rural regions. The interviewees unanimously claimed that the Russian-Estonian
minority is more conservative in terms of gender equality. While Russian-Estonian
women are somewhat equal with Estonian men, it can be presumed that Russian-
Estonian men are the most conservative towards women in politics. Two interviewees
emphasized that gender quality in general is not a topic of discussion amongst the
Russian-Estonian minority, largely due to the lack of media coverage (4,5). How-
ever, regional differences were interpreted in different ways. Representatives of the
Sotsiaalministeerium claimed that the differences based on regional location is quite
small and can be attributed to the small size of Estonia (2,11) and the interlinking
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Figure 3.4: Should there be a higher percentage of women in these levels (Vainu
et al., 2010, p. 136-137).
via the Internet. Others were sure that the differences between towns and country-
side were not that marginal because traditional values continue to be emphasized
more in the countryside (4,5,8,9,10).
When looking at the figures and numbers, Estonia seems to be a rather contra-
dictory case. While female representation is favored by the society, it becomes clear
that insurmountable barriers exist. Henceforth, the following sections will discuss
and analyze existing barriers in the political sphere of Estonia, according to Ingle-
hart’s approach.
Structural Barriers – Structural barriers appear based on the socioeconomic
situation. Thus, in order to identify the existence of restricting obstacles in the case
of Estonia, measures such as the gender pay gap, the occupations of women, and
the education levels need to be determined and weighed with the help of the expert
interviews.
The interviewed experts were consistently concerned with the high gender pay
gap in Estonia. According to Anspal and Ro˜o˜m, while the gender pay gap was
around 30% in 1993 and had dropped to about 24% in 1996, it then rose again
to 30% in 2005. Since then, it has been consistently at that level, resulting in the
highest gender pay gap in the European Union (Anspal & Ro˜o˜m, 2011, p. 3-4). Two
interviewees indicated that a common perception in Estonia is that women earn less
because they ask for less, hence it is their individual problem and not a societal issue
58
(5,6). The experts speaking for the Sotsiallministeerium stated that even though
there is a big gender pay gap, people are often not realizing the long-term effects
of women earning substantially less. While they might not feel the gap at present
times, when it comes to the retirement, women will be at risk of poverty due to the
low pensions (3). Another expert raised a further concern based on the gender pay
gap, namely women’s and children’s poverty resulting from the negative interplay of
the gender pay gap and the high number of single mothers in Estonia (8).
When looking at the labor sector with higher gender pay gaps, it becomes visi-
ble that ‘female’ occupations are negatively affected, mainly due to a strong labor
segregation (3,5,6). Sectors concerned with healthcare, education and service are
disproportionally female. In 2009, only 8% of men were employed in the healthcare
and social welfare sector (Ja¨rviste, 2010b, p. 6). Contradicting the common percep-
tion that the gender pay gap often appears as women are not on the same education
level as men, in Estonia, women are more educated than men. While having the
biggest gender pay gap, Estonia at the same time has the highest ratio of female
university graduates.
During the interviews, it nevertheless became clear that even though Estonian
women are highly educated, as soon as children are in the picture, women largely take
over the child-caring role. Three-fourths of the Estonian Eurobarometer participants
claimed that caring for the child has to be priority for a mother over her own
career (Directorate-General for Communication, 2010, p. 88). In Estonia, 96% of
women with children take parental leave in comparison to only 7% of men. One
reason is that childcare facilities for young children are not sufficiently provided
for, making work for women with young children nearly impossible (Po˜der, 2011,
p. 74-75, 81). Furthermore, 59,7% of children are born outside marriage, mainly to
single mothers. Hence, for a single mother, taking maternal leave is often the only
possibility as the childcare facilities are not given (European Commission - eurostat,
2012). Additionally, the Human Development Report claims, that “[t]his situation
can be explained by the traditional nature of Estonia’s gender regime, according
to which raising children is primarily the task of women, despite their high rate
of participation in the labour market” (Lauristin, 2010, p. 96). Pajumets states
in her dissertation that a main reason for women to take maternal leave is based
on the aftermath of the Soviet era. While women were not able to stay at home
with their children during the Soviet Union, after its collapse, Estonian women have
emphasized motherhood by concentrating on nurturing their offspring (Pajumets,
2012, p. 53). The Special Eurobarometer 376 shows that 74% agree that ‘Women
have less freedom because of their family responsibilities’ (European Commission,
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2012a, p. 24). Even 80% of Estonian respondents on a survey carried out by the
Sotsiaalministeerium in 2006 think that women face a double burden with the non-
domestic and domestic work, in comparison to men, who are mainly engaged in
non-domestic work (Heidmets, 2007, p. 22). Hence, while women take care of most
the household chores, they have less free time (Laas, 2005, p. 106; Putzi, 2008, p.
104; Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, 2009, p. 51, 55)
Therefore, connecting the named obstacles, it can be concluded that in Estonia
socioeconomic factors do constitute as barriers for women. Not only do women
earn almost 1/3 less than men (6), the high level of inflexibility of their labor force
(Po˜der, 2011, p. 74) is widely restricting women from entering the political sphere.
Furthermore, it seems as if women are forced to be concerned with family issues,
such as child-caring and the household to a far wider extent than men. Even though
Estonian women are generally better educated than Estonian men, women still retire
from their jobs in order to be the primary care-taker of the offspring. Hence, the
already small pension that women will receive will decrease even more as a result
of not working for several years. In addition to the money issue, women face the
problem of having less work experience as a result of staying at home. And finally,
regardless of working or not, as women are mainly responsible for the household
they have less free time.
Institutional Barriers – The second set of barriers are based on the institutional
settings of a country. Hence, the political and electoral system can restrict the
percentage of female representatives, while implemented measures such as quotas can
enhance the number of women in elected offices. Furthermore, political parties play a
major role in terms of party competition and the inner-party candidate recruitment
process.
After gaining re-independence in 1991, Estonia declared itself to be a parliamen-
tary democracy with a proportional representation. The national legislative body
is unicameral, and called Riigikogu, which has 101 seats. The Riigikogu Election
Act went into force on July 18th, 2002. Since then, several amendments have been
made, but nevertheless the core of the election law has stayed the same. The Es-
tonian citizens shall elect the “Members of the Riigikogu [...] by secret ballot on
the basis of a general, uniform and direct right to vote” (Estonian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, 2011, p. 1). Every Estonian citizen older than 18 on the day of the
election is allowed to vote, while candidates need to be at least 21. Citizens can
either vote traditionally, or since 2007, via the Internet. Estonia is divided into 12
multi-mandate districts. “The mandates are proportionally distributed based on the
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number of citizens entitled to vote in an electoral district” (Estonian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 1).
The distribution of mandates is based on a triple-tier system with three different
types of mandates: The personal mandate is distributed to candidates in the district
that fulfill the simple quota. The simple quota is calculated by dividing all national
votes by the seats of the Riigikogu (101 seats). The number received is the amount
of votes that are needed to pass the simple quota. Then the number of votes in each
district is divided by the simple quota, in order to show how many seats the district
has. The candidates that receive at least the number of votes needed for the simple
quota are directly elected to the Riigikogu. The district/regional mandates are given
dependent on the obtained votes, a list/joint list received in the district. Therefore,
the number of seats a list receives is the number of times the received votes fulfill the
quota, after deducting the personal mandates. The candidates on each list are then
ranked according to the amount of votes they gathered, and the candidates with
the most votes will receive the district/regional mandates. The remaining votes
of each district will be combined on the national level for each list/joint list. The
compensatory/national mandate is then distributed on the level of closed nation
wide party lists, amongst candidates that received at least 5% of the simple quota.
The mandates each list receives is calculated by a modified d’Hondt method (Biin,
2004, p. 25-28; Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).
Biin criticizes the electoral system, as she claims that it favors large parties.
Further, the third level of mandates are reserved for candidates that otherwise would
not have been able to get elected. Unfortunately, this tool is not used to increase
the number of female representatives, but instead, those votes are primarily given
to male candidates. Laas indicates that only “women who are among the first ten
or 20 candidates on a list are likely to be elected” (Laas, 2005, p. 104). Hence, the
candidates are largely dependent on the position the party leadership is given. This
criticism was unanimously given by the expert interviewees, identifying the electoral
system with its closed party list as a major barrier for women. Overall, the fact
that men are better known and popular during elections and are placed towards the
top of election lists which makes them already look like potential winners, results in
men receiving more votes than women (Raitviir, 2011, p. 151).
When asking about quotas, the experts had split opinions. In general, it needs
to be mentioned that the concept of quotas itself has a very bad connotation in
Estonia, based on the Soviet past. On the one hand, the system of quotas was very
much favored in order to break the male dominance and give women the chance to
prove themselves. As a fast and effective tool, the quota would ensure more balanced
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decision-making and relatively proportional representation (4,5,6). Nevertheless, it
was also indicated that most likely the so called ‘quota women’ would not be con-
sidered equal to other members of the Riigikogu and would therefore not be heard
(Laas, 2005, p. 108). In contrast, only 10% of the participants of the Eurobarometer
75.1 were naming the tool of quotas as the answer to higher female representation
(European Parliament, 2011, p. 20). On the other hand, the representative of the
Social Ministry indicated that they have chosen a wider approach for Estonia, and
are not considering the quota system. While this approach has the downside of
being comparable slower, “when it does occur then it is done by the people them-
selves. So it is not like somebody up above says that it has to be like that, but the
people themselves have reached to this understanding that we need more women to
participate” (3,9).
As some interviewees indicated, the quota would most likely never be implemented
in the electoral system of Estonia (5,8,11). Therefore, the author asked for opinions
towards a system of quotas in the political parties, as a tool for not only opening
up the chances for women to climb up on the party ladder internally, but also to
show that gender is not a criteria for good politicians. Such voluntary measures
were rather welcomed amongst the interviewees. However, as Allik argues, such list
quotas might not have as striking of an impact as expected because the election
against women has already happened before women are given the chance to even be
on the list (Allik, 2010, p. 148). Nevertheless, a so-called ‘zebra list’, meaning the
electoral list are composed of both sexes equally, was seen as a major improvement
by all interviewees. While one political party has had such a list during a national
election, namely Keskerakond the Center Party, none of the other political parties
in Estonia have ever implemented such a measure. Tiina Raitviir examined the
distribution and proportion of women on the party lists. Table 3.5 (on page 63)
shows that while the ‘zebra list’ of Keskerakond clearly increased the amount of
female candidates amongst the first 10 positions, the number of female candidates
situated on positions 11 to 30 was disproportionally small. For the other political
parties, only one or two of the first 10 positions were given to women, while amongst
positions 11 to 30, between nine and four candidates were female. Overall the highest
proportion amongst the first 30 positions was 1/3 of the candidates being female in
Keskerakond and Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond (SDE), and the lowest was only five
out of 30 positions being given to the female candidates of Isamaa ja Res Publica
Liit (IRL).
Hence, if the number of female candidates is not increased, then it is nearly
impossible to have a higher percentage of female members of parliament (Raitviir,
62
Table 3.5: Distribution of Female candidates amongst the first 30 places on the Elec-
tion Lists of the Political Parties (Raitviir, 2011, p. 155).
no of females amongst
positions 1-11 positions 11-33 last 25 positions
Keskerakond 5 5
SDE 1 9 8
Reformierakond 1 6 6
IRL 1 4
Rohelised 2 4 25
Rahvaliit 2 6
2011, p. 151). This trend can also be detected when looking at the answers Estonian
participants gave to the Eurobarometer 75.1. When being asked which measure
would be the most effective in encouraging female participation, 31% claimed that
‘Parity on the electoral lists drawn up by political parties at every election’ would
enhance the female participation (European Parliament, 2011, p. 20). However,
Miriam Allik criticizes the approach of Raitviir stating that the problem lies mainly
in the low number of women on top positions of the list, but indicates that the
problem is not solely the low number of women on top positions, but the low number
of women on the lists in general. If only 20 to 30% of the listed candidates are female,
it is unrealistic to expect that women hold 40 - 50% of the seats at the Riigikogu
(Allik, 2010, p. 141). Therefore, by only comparing the votes a male and female
candidate receives on the grounds of gender, the influence of the media coverage,
the value of the character and the factor of party membership are not taken into
account, as the average vote is not solely given on the grounds of gender but also
on the other factors, as Allik argues (2010, p. 141). Consequently, the focus should
be turned towards the party leadership in order to reach more gender equality and
a higher number of female candidates on the lists (Allik, 2010, p. 148).
Hence, the barrier resulting from the recruitment procedure that is named by In-
glehart needs more analysis. While there are no women amongst the current party
leaders (Raitviir, 2011, p. 148), which indicate a lack of role models for women to
look up to (5,6,12,), Allik indicates that the problem of inequality increases with
every step of the recruitment process since men are in general favored over women
and with every step more and more women are eliminated from the already low
number of women being willing to engage in the political recruitment procedure
(2010, p. 142-144). Helen Biin has dedicated her Master’s Thesis to the topic of
political recruitment. She concludes that four selection criteria seem to have an ef-
fect on the likelihood of women becoming candidates. “[P]opularity, vote collecting
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abilities, ticket balancing and previous party work” (Biin, 2004, p. 42). Several
interviewees indicated similarly, that so far women have not received as many votes
during elections as men. Henceforth, listing women seems to be a rather unpopular
and hindering decision for a party to gain as many seats as possible in an election.
Furthermore, women have to show more dedication in party work, which as dis-
cussed above is often not possible as women are the main care-takers of children
and the household aside from being employed. Biin further states that in general,
female candidates that are on the top positions of the party lists are highly edu-
cated. Furthermore, they are expected to gain reputation and status through years
of hard party work, which results in women having top positions on the electoral
lists being on average older then female candidates in general. Furthermore, frequent
incumbency was seen as a requirement for a top list position, as well as occupation,
particularly women employed in state offices (Biin, 2004, p. 44-47). She concludes
by indicating that “women are considered to be poorer candidates and politicians
than men, they are expected to compensate their handicap of having female gender”
(Biin, 2004, p. 47).
During the interviews an additional inequality was named when talking about
campaigning. Experts indicated that based on the system of monetary distribution
of campaigning funds, women are often discriminated against. In Estonia, candidates
have to pay for the electoral campaign themselves, whereas the party subsidizes
a certain amount of money. However, when looking at the distribution of such
campaign money, women often receive disproportionally fewer funds. Governmental
intervention was seen as the most suitable solution to ensure adequate distribution
of the monetary funding (5).
Overall, it can be concluded that in terms of institutional settings, barriers ex-
ist in the Estonian case. Based on the list system used in elections, women are
disproportionally pushed to the back of the lists, and as a result face problems in
getting elected. Even though, it was mentioned in the interviews that the women’s
organizations of the political parties are trying to emphasize the importance of bal-
ance according to gender, as well as women on lower list places have been receiving
votes regardless recently equality is far from reached. However, since women overall
have so far received proportionally less votes than men, the political leaders are not
appointing women to the top of the list, as the main goal during the election is to
receive as many votes in total as possible. A crucial factor therefore is the general
acceptance of women as political figures, because all support would not result in
success if the society is not willing to elect women. Henceforth, the next section will
deal with attitudes and cultural aspects towards women in politics.
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Cultural Barriers – In order to examine all aspects negatively affecting the repre-
sentation of women in parliaments, Inglehart includes the cultural aspect. A major
indicator of a balanced decision-making body is the value set of a society. Inglehart
claims that traditional values are hindering the acceptance of female politicians.
When assessing the cultural aspects, religion and the cultural heritage are the main
concepts in focus.
In the case of Estonia, religiosity is a crucial factor. Inglehart claims that the
decline of religiosity is connected to the transition to post-industrialism. Through
secularization, belief in god and the importance of the church is declining, while
values such as tolerance, sexual liberalization and equality are emphasized. In the
case of Estonia, religiosity does not seem to play a significant role. As Figure 3.5
6 (on page 66) shows, Estonia, indicated by the blue arrow, is one of the least
religious societies. However, as claimed by all interviewees, Estonia’s value system
is largely based on Christianity, in particular Lutheran Protestantism. Even though
the number of true believers is extremely low in Estonia, values such as the 10
commandments are mirrored in the Estonian culture. Further, as indicated earlier,
Weber claimed that through Christianity, work ethics evolved. Hence, as Estonia
was Christianized by Protestants, values such as hard-working prevailed until today.
Another major influence on cultural heritage in the case of Estonia, is the Soviet
past. Still today, the imprint from the time of suppression can be seen. As Inglehart
shows, a major imprint in Estonia’s value set is the low level of trust, based on the
past Soviet experience. Further, this can also be seen in the high level of survival
values as discussed above. Instead of freedom of expression and equality, Estonia’s
society emphasized economic development and security after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Whereas trust in others and institutions overall has increased since re-
independence, trust in church, press, and especially in the Riigikogu and the political
parties have declined tremendously (Heidmets, 2007, p. 61, 113; Heidmets, 2008,
p. 28-31). Furthermore, Andrus Saar writes that “based on the Estonian example,
one could say that the growth of tolerance has stopped half way. Tolerance has
increased towards ‘one’s own’ who have some problems, but the attitude towards
strangers (foreigners) has become increasingly repelling” (Lauristin, 2010, p. 112).
However, Estonia has made a great effort to drop the Soviet association and strive
towards belonging to the Nordic/Scandinavian societies. The expert interviewees
state that Estonia took the Nordic countries as a kind of role-model, where the state
wants to go, regardless of the different history (1). Further, while claiming to be
6Items: Importance of God, Comfort in religion, Belief in God, religious identity, Attend religious
service, Life after death
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Figure 3.5: Strength of Religiosity Scare (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 53-54).
Nordic and striving to belong to that group of societies, Estonia mainly emphasized
implementing and adopting features of the Nordic countries such as the economy,
the welfare state and creating wealth in general (6), though values and especially
gender equality were not included as priorities (8,10). “[W]hile people in Estonia
admire the living standard in the Nordic countries and would like to lead similar
affluent lifestyles, they are not understanding that gender equality is very much part
of the value system in the Nordic societies” (8). Furthermore, another expert claims
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that Estonia is not only striving to be Nordic, but also to be European, regardless
of really understanding and knowing what that means (7). An example was given
when an expert stated that when the ‘Finnish feminists’ came to Estonia to teach
and coach the Estonian women what gender equality is, the Estonian women were
repelled by the masculine look of the women. While Estonian women were eager
to ‘beautify’ after the fall of the Soviet Union, it seems as if this negative picture
is stuck in peoples mind when one speaks about emancipated women and feminists
(7,8,12).
Furthermore, Barbi Pilvre argues that the question of Nordic belonging versus
German identity has to be raised. While Estonia on the one hand counts itself
amongst the Nordic countries, even though there are great differences (Pilvre, 2000,
p. 60) not only historically but especially in identity and value set, Estonians on the
other hand are influenced by the “‘German’ model of femininity” (Pilvre, 2000, p.
63). Therefore, while identifying with the German model, the wish to be European
overpowers the wish to belong to the Nordic societies, even though in return that
means favoring Western patriarchal values over Nordic emancipation (Pilvre, 2000,
p. 63).
When arguing about the belonging to the Nordic societies, it has to be stated that
linguistically Estonia belongs to the Finno-Ugric language family. Hence, Estonia
is a genderless language “characterized by the complete lack of grammatical gender
distinction in the noun system” (Prewitt-Freilino et al., 2012, p. 268-269). While
it seems that genderless languages benefit the likeliness to positively impact gender
inequality, measurements show that in terms of political empowerment and gender
equality, gender neutral is the most beneficial language group, followed by genderless
and finally gendered language. The authors of the study indicate that regardless of
genderless language, words such as riigimees = statesman/politician 7, peremees =
head of household/person in charge 8 and o˜de = sister and nurse are claimed to
have an impact on gender stereotypes, especially in terms of occupation and work
titles (Prewitt-Freilino et al., 2012, p. 270-271, 274, 278). Additionally, genderless
languages “can include seemingly gender neutral terms that in fact connote a male
bias (just as natural and gendered languages), but because they do not possess
grammatical gender, it is not possible to use female pronouns or nouns to ‘emphasize
women’s presence in the world’” (Prewitt-Freilino et al., 2012, p. 279).
7The work riigimees implies a somewhat respectable and honorable position. The term is often
used for a person that used to be a politician, but is still active publicly. A more common term
for politician is poliitik. However, when talking about female politicians, they are referred to
as naise poliitik.
8The term peremees used to identify the head of the household. Nowadays it is more used in
sense of being in charge
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Furthermore, accordingly to Inglehart, sexual liberalization, including premarital re-
lations, divorce, abortion, homosexuality and gender equality, indicate the emphasis
a society puts on egalitarian values. As it was explained in the sections before,
measuring gender equality may lead to false outcomes in the case of Estonia due
to a misunderstanding of the concept. Hence, sexual liberalization is used as an
alternative and clarifying measure to see how far the Estonian society emphasizes
egalitarian values, and hence paves the way for more female representation. All in-
terviewees explained that premarital cohabitation is a perfectly normal situation in
Estonia. Most of Estonia’s children are actually born outside of marriage as stated
before. While this egalitarian approach is seen as modern, it does contain risks. As
there is no legal basis for those relationships, in the case of an end of a cohabitation,
the legal basis for settling such situations is not as developed as in the case of a
divorce (1). Further, the experts indicated that the Estonian society is very open
towards divorce. This can be seen as a ‘leftover’ from the Soviet era, where divorce
was legalized. A third concept of sexual liberalization is abortion. While most of the
experts agreed that in Estonia the act of abortion is not negatively viewed, it is also
crucial to add that this is due to its legalization in 1955 in the Soviet Union. How-
ever, Pilvre indicates that even though women had the right to abort, the conditions
were inhumane and the issue was not handled privately (Pilvre, 2000, p. 61). After
the fall of the Soviet Union, there have been anti-abortion movements (7), however
the experts claim that the general public is not very critical. Additionally, Ingle-
hart includes the acceptance of homosexuality to the trend of sexual liberalization.
The officials claimed that the Estonian society is somewhat distancing themselves
from homosexuality, whereas younger Estonians, in particular females are showing
a positive trend in terms of attitudes towards, and acceptance, of homosexuality.
Furthermore, experts indicate that the large spread of homophobia can be traced
back to the criminalization of homosexuality in the Soviet Union (11). One expert
claimed that the discourse of homosexuality in Estonia is approximately at the stage
where the discourse of gender equality had been 15 years ago (4).
Generally, it can be concluded that Estonia’s cultural settings are at first glance
favorable for the acceptance of women in politics. This approach is verified by mea-
surements displayed in the Gender Equality monitoring, as an official of the Social
Ministry claims, since in 2009, 47% of the Estonian society thought that men are not
better political leaders as women. However on the downside, still 43% are in favor of
the statement. Further measurements that Inglehart claims to be crucial in assessing
a societies attitudes towards gender equality is the question of women having to have
children to fulfill their goal. The official numbers show that in 2008, children were
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seen as necessary to fulfill a women’s life-goal by 73.2% (3). Furthermore, general
perceptions of the interviewees were that amongst young educated women, children
are not as important. Nevertheless, one expert concluded the discussion with drastic
words, as she indicated that “female bodies are for entertainment in Estonia, or for
birth-giving, the two things, not more!” (5). Henceforth, the perception of children
being important is rather diverse in the case of Estonia. While striving for European
belonging instead of Nordic membership, Estonia sacrificed the Nordic emancipa-
tion. Additionally, the positive impact on gender equality of Estonian, a genderless
language, is rather overrated and foreshadowing. Moreover, as the experts claim,
Estonians egalitarian approach of sexual liberalization, leaving homosexuality and
gender equality aside, is partially based on the implementation of legal rights from
the Soviet past. Therefore, the homophobia and the rather restricted acceptance of
gender equality in Estonia are better indicators of the cultural barriers.
Overall, this analysis shows the contradictory situation of Estonia according to In-
glehart’s theoretical approach. While Estonia is somewhat in-between industrial and
post-industrial societies, with a democracy that seems to be advanced compared to
other CEE societies, but not advanced enough to compete with the ‘older democ-
racies’, its labor force is mainly rooted in the service and knowledge sector. As one
expert pointed out, “we have [a] good slogan, knowledge-based society” (5). Further,
while rating relatively high on secular-rational values, Estonia is lagging behind on
the shift towards self-expression values. One explanation is the Romanticism of, and
return to, the traditional family model of the 30s after Estonia re-gained indepen-
dence in 1991. While before women were almost invariably part of the labor force
next to carrying all the household and child-caring duties, after the independence,
women started to become home-makers again. Nevertheless, women were forced
back into the labor market in order to make ends meet. A further indicator is the
strong materialistic value-orientation, as well as the beautification of women, based
on the low living-conditions and poor economy in the Soviet past.
Estonia’s path towards gender equality can be summed up by two major influences.
On the one hand, the negative connotation and misinterpretation on the basis of
misusage, of gender equality in the Soviet Union, as well as on the other hand,
the liberalization through the imposition of a specific legal and institutional setting
through the European Union. In terms of gender equality in the political sphere,
Estonia’s situation is largely unbalanced. Furthermore, differences in ethnicity and
location of female representatives were detected.
After identifying the main barriers throughout the structural, institutional and
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cultural settings of the Estonian society, the first impression is deceptive. Whereas
women are highly educated and largely employed, they face severe discrimination
in terms of the large gender pay gap. Further, Estonia’s segregated labor force
also contributes to the negative impact of women. Additionally, the double burden
detected in the Soviet era still remains as women are still in the role of the main
care-taker of the children and the household. Hence, contrary to Inglehart’s claim
that socioeconomic barriers do not have a major impact on the percentage of female
representatives, in the case of Estonia it can be argued that low income, less time
and more concerning about family clearly constitutes barriers for women.
In addition to those barriers, the electoral system used in Estonia is not only
negatively affecting the election of women, but the party culture and recruitment
criteria seem to discriminate on the basis of gender. Keeping the structural barriers
in mind, it seems to be nearly impossible for ordinary women to set foot in the
political sphere. While women have less time, they are expected to invest dispro-
portionally more monetary and human resources to get acknowledged by the party
leaders, who are without exception men.
As the last section of this chapter has shown, cultural aspects do matter in the
case of Estonia. The partial acceptance of sexual liberalization suggests that the
church is not having an impact on everyday life per se, whereas the Soviet past and
the Estonian language is. Therefore, as Estonia at first glance seems to be rather
egalitarian, when analyzing other attitudes, towards for example homosexuality and
gender equality, Estonia’s ‘true’ position is detected.
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3.5 Application of Inglehart’s Modernization
Theory on the Case of Estonia
After identifying the main barriers that women face in Estonia in entering the po-
litical sphere, Inglehart’s overall approach has to be tested. Hence this section will
first analyze if Inglehart’s theory can be verified in the case of Estonia, as well as
examine why the theory can only explain parts of the transition and situation in
Estonia.
The theory states that economic development and a society’s cultural heritage
influence a shift from survival to self-expression vales, which then emphasize val-
ues that lead to a higher percentage of women in parliaments. For the case of
Estonia each concept will be analyzed in this section. First, in terms of economic
development, Estonia increased its GDP per capita, however not high enough to
be considered a post-industrial society. Therefore, it can be claimed that Estonia
is at an intermediate stage between industrial and post-industrial societies. Even
though, industrial societies have the largest labor force in industrial work, in Estonia
the knowledge and service sector constitute the main workforce. However, the eco-
nomic development also increased the gender pay gap, as the labor force in Estonia
is extremely gender segregated.
While Inglehart claims that religion largely defines a society’s cultural heritage, in
Estonia religion is rather secondary. Estonia is highly secular and is one of the most
non-religious societies in the world. However, the fact that Estonia is a European
country cannot be disregarded as it is therefore based on Christian values, mainly
the 10 commandments. Therefore, the measures taken by Inglehart in order to
assess the position of Estonia in terms of religiosity seems to be misguided, as it
only takes the attitudes towards religion and belief, as well as the activity in church
into account.
More important, in the Estonian case, the influence of past events have to be
analyzed. While Estonia is situated in Northern Europe, and it has been under
different rules (Swedish, German, Soviet) in the past, and hence their imprints can
be still seen today. In terms of Nordic belonging, even though historically the two
overlap, in terms of values and culture, Estonia is far from being actually Nordic.
However in terms of language families, Estonian and Finnish belong to the Finno-
Urgric language family. Therefore culturally, it was claimed that on the one hand
gender equality has benefited through the genderless language, whereas on the other
hand occupational titles are often masculine or feminine depending on the work
sector, resulting in segregation. However, the most important and most significant
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imprint on Estonia’s cultural heritage is the Soviet past, which still contributed to
the negative attitudes towards gender equality.
The predicted value shift from survival to self-expression values on the second
dimension of Inglehart’s value map, can only be slowly recorded for Estonia. After
the fall of the Soviet Union, Estonia initially moved towards survival values, until
1996, when it again started to transition towards self-expression values. Hence, the
value shift from survival to self-expression values has been taking place in Estonia,
however very slowly. While Inglehart indicates that the concepts of sexual liberaliza-
tion is accepted amongst post-industrial societies, Estonia once again proves to be a
contradiction. While accepting and tolerating divorce, pre-marital relationships and
abortion, Estonians are rather reserved when it comes to gender equality and homo-
sexuality. Furthermore, Estonia is still transitioning towards a Postmaterial society.
In terms of further self-expression values, the Estonian society has low scores on
inter-personal trust, as stated above, as well as securing the financial and economic
stability seem to so still play a major role.
Therefore, even though the precondition of economic development and non-religiosity
are given for the case of Estonia, Inglehart’s theory does not hold due to the strong
emphasis of historical, cultural and socioeconomic factors. Overall, Inglehart misses
to specifically take the negative connotation and experience of gender equality and
the quota system amongst the CEE societies into account. While in the case of Es-
tonia, after over 20 years of independence, the concept of women in politics is slowly
gaining prestige, the deeply rooted perception of gender equality is hindering the
effectiveness of measures and programs initiated by the Sotsiaalministeerium and
the women’s organizations.
Hence, what the theory is missing for the specific case of Estonia can be concluded.
First, while Inglehart mentions the importance of historical events, he underesti-
mates their strong impact and long-lasting imprint. Hence, in the case of Estonia,
he fails to consider the major impact of the misunderstanding gender equality due to
previous negative experiences with imposed equality and quotas. Second, Inglehart
stresses the emphasis of cultural barriers and on the minimal effect of structural
barriers restricting women from entering the political sphere. However in the case
of Estonia, the socioeconomic situation is crucial, since a high gender pay gap and
little free time due to the double burden result in insuperable obstacles. Further,
the rigid obstacles of the Estonian electoral system create burden for women to be
able to participate in politics on the national level. Here again, Inglehart underes-
timates the restricting influence of the recruitment criteria for candidates and also
the acceptance of female candidates amongst the Estonian society. Third, Inglehart
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claims that younger generations are more liberal, tolerant and open-minded, though
in Estonia a trend of young men emphasizing traditional values over emancipation
is present. Overall, while Inglehart’s theory seems quite striking and universally
applicable, the case of Estonia bears too many contradicting trends to fully apply
the theory. Hence, even though Ingelhart’s positioning of Estonia on his cultural
map seem legitimate, his explanations of why and how the values change, influence
and are influenced, are not in line with the the findings of this study.
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4 CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this thesis was to analyze if and how Inglehart’s approach on the under-
representation of women in parliament can be applied to the case of Estonia. First,
Inglehart, Norris and Welzel’s theory (2002) on economic development and cultural
heritage triggering a shift in a society’s value set was introduced. While survival
values are emphasized amongst agrarian and industrial societies, post-industrial so-
cieties are largely based on self-expression values, and therefore put greater emphasis
on tolerance, openness, freedom and equality. Furthermore, the scholars identified
three sets of barriers: structural barriers concerning socioeconomic issues, institu-
tional barriers, including the political and electoral system as well as the political
party competition and candidate recruitment process, and finally cultural barriers,
largely based on a society’s religiousness. Due to the strong impact of a past full
of occupations, and the short period of independence, the group of Central East-
ern European societies were examined according to Inglehart’s approach separately.
This was necessary in order to see if the CEE societies face rather unique problems
in terms of gender equality based on the experiences from the Soviet past. The
first section was concluded by the criticisms of several scholars, whereas the most
important issue for this research was the lack of specificity in terms of defining the
concepts in use.
Next, the empirical methods used were introduced. Since the number of publica-
tions about this specific topic is rather limited, the author interviewed 12 experts
in the field of gender equality. Those experts represented different institutions and
groups, such as the Gender Equality Department of the Sotsiaalminissteerium and
women’s organizations. The data retrieved from the interviews was analyzed and
compared to reports by the Estonian government and the European Union.
The main part of the thesis consists of the analysis in chapter three. According
to Inglehart’s definitions Estonia would be categorized as a newer democracy, while
being in an intermediate state between industrial and post-industrial society. This
assumption rests on the composition of the labor force in Estonia, because Estonia
is largely based on the knowledge and service sector. While Estonia is also very
non-religious and therefore ranks high on the secular-rational level, Estonia has yet
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to shift towards strongly emphasizing self-expression values. This trend can also be
detected when it comes to gender equality. Due to the Soviet tradition of enforcing
equality and by extension, the double burden on women, Estonian society is rather
sceptical when it comes to enforcing gender equality. Furthermore, after the collapse
of the Soviet Union Estonia underwent a short phase of Romanticism, emphasizing
patriotism, traditional values and family roles. Nevertheless, during the past years,
due to EU accession, Estonia implemented the Gender Equality Act and established
institutional bodies focused on the issue of gender equality. However, these laws and
regulations were largely simply implemented and not enforced. Hence, in terms of
female representation, the Estonian Riigikogu’s composition is unbalanced gender
wise.
In order to identify what is holding women back from entering the political sphere
and becoming candidates for the Riigikogu, the three sets of barriers were analyzed.
The structural barriers in Estonia were very restrictive, as women are not able
to participate in the political sphere as much as men can, due to the fact that
women have less free time based on the double burden and the gender pay gap. In
terms of institutional settings the greatest barriers include candidate recruitment
and selection criteria as well as position on the electoral list – since women were
seen as the poorer candidates and hence have be better educated, and contribute
more work to the party than men. Furthermore, Estonia’s electoral system was also
identified as a barrier.
The last set of barriers, namely cultural barriers, which Inglehart’s approach iden-
tifies as the most influential, depicted Estonia as very contradictory. According to
the theory, due to Estonia’s secularism Estonia should be putting very little emphasis
on traditional values. However, when looking at the attitudes towards the concepts
of sexual liberalization, namely premarital relations, divorce, abortion, homosexual-
ity and gender equality, Estonia shows contradictions. While tolerating premarital
relations, divorce and abortion, the other two concepts, homosexuality and gender
equality, are not widely accepted. Furthermore, Estonia’s close ties and strife for
belonging to the Nordic countries should influence the attitudes and perceptions to-
wards gender equality and self-expression values per se. Nevertheless, it was found
that the strong impact of the Soviet past outweighs other historical factors. Espe-
cially as the Soviet imprint of gender equality and the foreshadowing inclusion of
women in Soviet politics hinders the society today from understanding the benefits
and emphasizing the importance of women in the political sphere. Hence, it can
be concluded that while the church in Estonia does not have a strong impact on
Estonia’s culture, the Soviet past, and to a certain extend Christian values, do.
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Finally, it can be concluded that based on the findings, the theory developed by In-
glehart, Norris and Welzel is not fully applicable to the case of Estonia. Even though
Estonia has undergone economic development, the shift towards self-expression val-
ues has not yet taken place in proportion. While Inglehart largely emphasizes reli-
gion when defining cultural heritage, he seems to underrate the imprint and long-
lasting influence of the Soviet past in the case of the Central Eastern European
societies.
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List of Interview Partners
This list shows the relevant information of the interview partners. The names have
been removed and numbers have been addressed to each interviewee. Further, the
interviewees background/occupation and its approximate age is stated.
Number Background Age Place & Date
1 Independent advisory body 30 - 40 years Tallinn, 30.08.2012
2 Sotsiaalkomisjon 30 - 40 years Tallinn, 24.09.2012
3 Sotsiaalkomisjon < 30 years Tallinn, 24.09.2012
4 former Sotsiaalkomisjon 30 - 40 years Tallinn, 21.09.2012
5 former Sotsiaalkomisjon & NGO > 60 years Tallinn, 24.09.2012
6 former Sotsiaalkomisjon & NGO 50 - 60 years Tallinn, 24.09.2012
7 University 30 - 40 years Tallinn, 17.09.2012
8 NGO & University 30 - 40 years Tallinn, 28.08.2012
(completed via mail by 06.09.2012)
9 NGO > 60 years Tallinn, 29.08.2012
10 NGO < 30 years Tallinn, 18.09.2012
11 NGO > 60 years Tallinn, 18.09.2012
12 NGO & MP 40 - 50 years Tartu, 15.09.2012
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Appendix 1
APPENDIXES
Figures and Tables by Inglehart, Norris and Welzel
Table A.1: Correlation of Additional Items with the Traditional/Secular-Rational
Values Dimension (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 26).
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Table A.2: Correlation of Additional Items with the Survival/Self-Expression Values
Dimension (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 27).
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Appendix 2
Figures and Tables for the Case of Estonia
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Appendix 2
Figure A.1: Role of Government Scale, 1990-2001. Women more left-wing than men
- women more right wing than men (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 82).
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Appendix 3
Interview Question Set
• What does gender equality mean for you?
• Why do you think gender equality would/might be important for Estonia?
• Currently, 22.8% of the seats in the Riigikogu are held by women. What are
the consequences for Estonia? → Would you say the Estonian parliament is
unbalanced?
• In terms of political parties, is political recruitment a problem? (Supply –
demand) Meaning, are there not enough available female candidates? Or are
people unwilling to vote for women?
• What is, in your opinion, the main reason why there are more men than women
in parliament?
• What would encourage women in Estonia to care, actively participate, run for
election?
• When looking at the % of women in parliament, one might ask why is there
no quota?
• In your opinion, should political parties have quotas?
• In terms of political activism in Estonia, memberships in political parties and
in labor unions are not common. Why? → What role does Estonia’s Soviet
past play?
• A general trend is that women participate more in the field of social policy –
can this be said for Estonia? Would you say that one reason is because women
are the main beneficiaries of social policy?
• Is there a traditional gender gap (women more conservative than men, more
likely to vote for right- center parties) or a modern gender gap (women move
towards left of men) in Estonia? Meaning, are women more conservative than
men or vice versa?
• Is it that Estonians think that a woman has to have children to complete their
mission in life?
• How common is the perception that ’Men make better politicians/ political
leaders than women?
88
Appendix 3
• Due to Estonia’s past, is gender equality seen as a Soviet concept? What are
the consequences? Is there a great generational difference, amongst people
that grew up in Soviet Estonia and that grew up during the 90s?
• After the regaining of independence, would you say that there was a focus
on national identity/patriotism? Did that make attitudes in general more
traditional and conservative? Are there generational differences? (e.g. younger
generations being more egalitarian?)
• Why is there no women’s movement in Estonia?
• Is there a big difference between Estonians and Russian Estonians in attitudes
to gender , and women in politics? ?
• Are there regional differences in attitudes to gender, and women in politics?
• Does religion play a role in Estonia’s culture?
• Would you say Estonians are open to ’sexual liberalization’, e.g., accepting
divorce, premarital relations, abortion, homosexuality? Are there differences
between generations?
• Do you consider Estonia materialist or post-materialist? Estonia claims to
belong among the Nordic countries. When comparing attitudes towards gender
equality, it becomes clear that Estonia is still far from being a Nordic country.
Wouldn’t the desire to be Nordic increase the demand for gender equality and
hence more women in parliament?
• During the accession period of the EU, what were the major changes that
Estonia went through in terms of gender equality? Were there general changes
in the attitudes of people towards women in leading positions?
• Was the accession favorable for women in Estonia’s political sphere? If yes,
what are the benefits?
• Would you agree with Inglehart, that modernization can lead to more freedom,
trust, openness as well as democracy and gender equality? If yes, do you see
Estonia and its people undergoing this process?
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